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DRONE ZONING*
TROY A. RULE**
The growing popularity of small civilian drones has generated a
wide array of complex and unprecedented regulatory challenges.
Many of these challenges, such as keeping drones away from
manned aircraft, are matters that the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) is clearly authorized and well equipped
to address. However, several other drone policy challenges relate
solely to drones’ potential to disrupt landowners’ privacy and to
otherwise interfere with activities on the ground. The nature and
severity of these conflicts often varies greatly depending on a
drone’s specific location; drone uses that are welcomed in some
city neighborhoods may be prohibitively disruptive in others.
The FAA, a centralized federal agency, lacks the information
and resources necessary to effectively regulate these inherently
local drone use issues. Recognizing this fact, cities and states are
increasingly crafting their own drone laws. Soon, some
municipalities might even find it beneficial to adopt drone zoning
ordinances that specifically restrict where, when, and under what
conditions civilian drones may fly within their jurisdictions.
Unfortunately, the FAA has taken the position that it holds
extremely broad regulatory authority over nearly every aspect of
civilian drone activity—a position that threatens to preclude the
development of valuable state and local drone policies. What
aspects of drone activity could be better regulated at the state or
local level than at the federal level? And what principles should
guide municipal governments as they craft drone policies for
their own communities? This Article tackles these questions,
highlighting the potential merits of greater state and local
involvement in drone law and identifying foundational principles

* © 2016 Troy A. Rule.
** Professor of Law, Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of
Law. J.D. 2005 University of Chicago Law School; B.S. 2001, Brigham Young University.
The author wishes to thank Karen Bradshaw Schulz, Laura Napoli Coordes, Zachary J.
Gubler, Rhett B. Larson, Kaipo Matsumura, Erin Adele Scharff; attendees of New
America July 2015 “Drones and Aerial Observation” Conference; and participants in the
Ohio State Business Law Journal October 2015 “Drones as Disruption” Symposium for
their valuable insights on the issues covered in this Article. Thanks also to John Keiter for
his excellent research assistance.

95 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2016)

134

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

and concepts for the pioneering design of drone zoning
ordinances.
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INTRODUCTION
Which level of government should have authority to restrict
where and when drones may fly above a particular city neighborhood
to deliver pizzas or take aerial photos? Should federal regulators have
sole power to make these determinations for every community in the
country, or should local citizens and officials have a say? And what
principles should guide policymaking aimed at addressing conflicts
between drones and landowners? Technology often stretches the
bounds of existing laws, compelling courts and legislators to confront
complicated new policy challenges. Today, this pattern is repeating
itself once again as governments face a complex set of issues arising
from advancements in civilian unmanned aircraft or “drone”
technologies.1
Many of the new regulatory challenges associated with civilian
drones relate to the risks that these devices can pose to manned
aviation and homeland security—risks that the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) and other federal agencies are clearly
authorized and well-positioned to handle. Federal regulation is
needed both to restrict drone flying near airports, helicopters, military
facilities, borders, and other nationally significant places and to keep
drones out of the higher-altitude airspace where conventional
airplanes fly. Nationwide drone registration programs, which would
aid law enforcement officials and others in identifying unlawful drone
operators, likewise require federal government involvement.2
Uniform federal drone manufacturing and performance standards
would benefit both the drone industry and consumers by enabling
manufacturers to design drones suitable for sale anywhere within the
United States.3
However, several other new policy questions involving drone
technologies relate primarily to drones’ potential to cause localized
disturbances to private landowners. For example, in what specific

1. In this Article, I use the term “civilian” drones to refer to all non-military drones,
including both commercial and recreational drones.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 156–63.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 143–55.
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neighborhoods and during what times of day should Amazon be
allowed to send drones to deliver packages? Where and when should
real estate agents be permitted to use drones to take aerial
photographs of homes they are listing for sale? And under what
conditions should wedding photographers be authorized to capture
drone-assisted footage of an outdoor wedding ceremony? The FAA
currently claims that it has preemptive regulatory authority over most
of these issues.4 However, in many contexts, these matters bear little
or no relation to protecting manned aviation, establishing national
uniform design standards, addressing interstate conflicts, or
protecting national interests, so arguments for preemptive federal
jurisdiction over these matters seem tenuous at best.5 And with more
and more states and municipalities crafting their own drone use laws,
it is increasingly apparent that many questions regarding the scope of
the FAA’s control over civilian drone activity remain up in the air.6
State and municipal governments seem better suited than the
federal government to address many of the inherently local issues
associated with civilian drones. Drones’ impacts on landowners often
vary significantly depending on where the drone is flying. For
instance, drone activity tends to be far more disruptive over secluded
residential backyards and pools than over warehouse buildings in
industrial areas.7 Unfortunately, a large federal agency like the FAA
is neither designed nor equipped to engage in the degree of locationsensitive policymaking required to effectively account for these sorts
of locational differences in every city in the country.8 Indeed, broadbrush federal policymaking and enforcement can only take drone
regulation so far. At some point, inventive new state and local drone
policies will be needed to address those aspects of drone regulation
that only landowners and officials with firsthand, neighborhood-level
information can efficiently address.
Eventually, some cities might even wish to adopt “drone zoning”
laws—ordinances that supplement FAA drone regulations by
imposing an additional layer of restrictions on where and when small
drones may fly within their municipal boundaries. Cities and counties
throughout the country have long employed horizontal zoning

4. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Section II.A.
6. See infra notes 173–79 and accompanying text (providing examples of recently
enacted state drone statutes); infra notes 240–46 and accompanying text (outlining
examples of recently enacted local drone ordinances).
7. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Section III.C.
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techniques to segregate incompatible land uses and cluster synergistic
ones in an effort to increase the productivity and value of scarce land
resources.9 Zoning law rests upon the notion that, like a “pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard[,]” certain land uses may be perfectly
acceptable in some locations within a city and yet be prohibitively
disruptive in others.10 This truism applies equally to civilian drone
flights. Accordingly, municipal drone zoning ordinances offer a
potentially powerful way for cities to accommodate valuable drone
uses within their boundaries without unduly compromising the safety
and privacy interests of local citizens.
This Article sets forth legal and normative arguments favoring
greater state and local involvement in civilian drone regulation and
offers some foundational principles for this emerging area of law. Part
I highlights the recent growth of the civilian drone industry and
describes why it would be difficult for an almost exclusively federal
regulatory structure to effectively govern the nation’s increasing
volume of conflicts between drone operators and landowners. Part II
analyzes the complicated federal preemption questions associated
with drone regulation, ultimately arguing that many types of state and
local drone laws are legally defensible and are vital to generating
efficient policy outcomes. Part III delineates those aspects of drone
regulation that seem best suited for governance at the federal, state,
and local government levels, respectively. Part IV then applies basic
microeconomics to identify some guiding principles for the
structuring of drone use ordinances capable of promoting more
optimal use of the low-altitude airspace above cities and towns as
drone technologies mature and spread throughout the world.
I. THE RISE OF SMALL DRONES
The civilian drone industry has taken off in dramatic fashion in
recent years. Over the past decade, the industry has blossomed from a
niche hobby market into one of the most rapidly expanding markets
in the world. Global sales of small drones increased by 167% from
2013 to 2015, and sales are only expected to continue to climb over

9. Mona Qureshi & Robin King, 3 Ways Land-Use Planning and Zoning Can
Increase Urban Density, THECITYFIX (Aug. 18, 2015), http://thecityfix.com/blog/three-waysland-use-planning-zoning-can-increase-urban-density-mona-qureshi-robin-king/ [https://perma
.cc/C9KF-NXDY].
10. Justice George Sutherland is credited with first drawing this analogy between land
uses and farm animals in the famous Village of Euclid opinion, in which the United States
Supreme Court generally upheld the facial constitutionality of modern zoning laws. Vill. of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
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the next several years.11 These futuristic flying devices, which are also
termed “unmanned aircraft systems”12 or “unmanned aerial
vehicles,”13 come in a wide variety of sizes and models.14 Unlike the
large military drones that have grown increasingly instrumental in
overseas warfare,15 most civilian drones weigh a few dozen pounds or
less and are designed for commercial and recreational uses.16
A. Soaring Popularity and a Growing List of Commercial Uses
Markets for both recreational and commercial drones are
expanding at breakneck pace. Major retailers now stock their shelves
with recreational drones and actively market them alongside more
familiar electronic devices.17 For a few hundred dollars or less, one
11. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2016–2036,
at 31–32 (2016), https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/media
/FY2016-36_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UMS-986S]; Paul Bedard,
Drone Sales Surge 167% to 4.3 Million, U.S. Leads but China Catching Up, WASH. EXAMINER
(May 29, 2015, 12:31 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/drone-sales-surge-167-to-4.3million-u.s.-leads-but-china-catching-up/article/2565240 [http://perma.cc/Q5LE-ZJMP].
12. See, e.g., Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa
.gov/uas/ [https://perma.cc/T346-YF62] (last modified Aug. 29, 2016, 2:20:13 PM)
(demonstrating that “unmanned aircraft system” is the term the FAA commonly uses to
describe a small civilian drone).
13. See, e.g., John Horgan, The Drones Come Home, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar.
2013, at 125 (stating that “drone advocates . . . generally prefer the term UAV, for
unmanned aerial vehicle”). Drones have even more labels than those already identified.
14. See ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, http://www.auvsi.org/home
[http://perma.cc/D7UL-ZU6Z] (providing an example of a large, global nonprofit
association focused on advancing the civilian drone community, including by offering an
unmanned systems and robotics directory and describing drone devices using various
popular terms, including “unmanned systems” and “unmanned airborne surveillance”).
15. The primary legal issues related to military drones are markedly different from
civilian drone questions and fall outside the scope of this Article. See generally Oren
Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2015)
(providing an introductory description of military drones).
16. See Jack Nicas & Colum Murphy, Who Builds the World’s Most Popular Drones?,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2014, 1:54 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/who-builds-the-worldsmost-popular-drones-1415645659 (describing China-based DJI as “the world’s biggest
consumer drone maker by revenue, selling thousands of its 2.8-pound, square-foot devices
for about $1,000 each” and portraying the ubiquity of DJI’s Phantom series of drones as
comparable to that of Ford’s Model T in the early development of the automobile
industry).
17. See, e.g., Sarah Nassauer, Sam’s Club Bets Drones Will Fly off the Shelves at
Christmas, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sams-clubbets-drones-will-fly-off-the-shelves-at-christmas-1433795119 (reporting that, for the 2015
holiday shopping season, retailer Sam’s Club “plans to stock about a dozen [drones]—
from $100 models to $4,000 versions with high resolution cameras or the ability to pick up
small objects”); see also Rick Aristotle Munarriz, A Drone Comes to Rescue Best Buy,
AOL. (Apr. 23, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.aol.com/article/2015/04/23/drone-could-rescuebest-buy/21174684/ [http://perma.cc/Q2FT-LVSV] (describing retailer Best Buy’s preparations
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can easily purchase a ready-to-fly drone equipped with a highdefinition camera and zoom lens capable of capturing aerial photos
and video previously attainable only aboard airplanes or helicopters.18
In part because of this burgeoning retail market, some commentators
predict that there will be more than one million drone flights per day
in the United States by the year 2035.19
Commercial enterprises are also showing increasing interest in
the wide range of potentially valuable applications of drone
technologies. The agricultural industry is abuzz over the prospective
cost savings and safety advantages of using drones for crop dusting20
and surveying.21 Amazon and other companies are actively pursuing
plans to use drones for product deliveries.22 Popular interest in droneto begin selling drones in its brick and mortar stores as part of the company’s turnaround
plan); Photography Drones, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/b?node=9699105011
[http://perma.cc/EQ9F-BBNM] (showing Amazon’s online retail presence for civilian
drones).
18. See Jim Fisher, The Best Drones of 2016, PCMAG.COM (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www
.pcmag.com/roundup/337251/the-best-drones [http://perma.cc/C3JJ-U6QX] (reviewing several
high-performing recreational drones that are available on the mainstream retail market).
19. Andrew Wood, Are There Enough Drone Laws for the Coming Drone Wars?,
CNBC (May 29, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/29/drones-and-drone-laws
-are-starting-to-take-off.html [http://perma.cc/GQY9-N6RD] (citing a study by the
Consumer Electronics Association); CEA Research: UAS Could Reach 1 Million U.S. Flights
a Day in 20 Years, CONSUMER TECH. ASS’N (May 5, 2015), https://www.ce.org/News/NewsReleases/Press-Releases/2015-Press-Releases/CEA-Research-UAS-Could-Reach-1-Million-U
-S-Flights.aspx [http://perma.cc/E77S-89PD].
20. Quinten Plummer, FAA Approves Yamaha RMAX Drone to Spray Crops in U.S.,
TECH TIMES (May 6, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/51049/20150506
/faa-approves-yamaha-rmax-drone-to-spray-crops-in-u-s.htm [http://perma.cc/F2AX-V7VE]
(describing the FAA’s grant of an exemption for the use of a type of Yamaha-produced
drone to “disperse tanks of fertilizer and pesticides across large swathes of land”); see also
Luke Runyon, Monsanto, World’s Largest Seed Company, Sets off a Corporate ‘Feeding
Frenzy’, NEB. EDUC. TELECOMMS. (Aug. 17, 2015, 6:45 AM), http://netnebraska.org/article
/news/986002/monsanto-worlds-largest-seed-company-sets-corporate-feeding-frenzy [http://
perma.cc/48YU-PRQK] (noting that Monsanto has “started looking at how drones can be
deployed on farms”).
21. See Clay Dillow, Why 2015 Is the Year Agriculture Drones Take off, FORTUNE
(May 18, 2015, 5:02 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/05/18/drone-agriculture/ [http://perma.cc
/7UCQ-LX9W] (describing some agricultural companies’ plans to use drones to assist in
crop monitoring and data gathering as a means of boosting crop yields).
22. See, e.g., Jordan Golson, Patent Application Reveals New Details About Amazon’s
Drone, WIRED (May 15, 2015, 7:32 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/patent-applicationreveals-new-details-amazons-drone/ [http://perma.cc/N6ZU-8AZV] (describing Amazon’s
patent application for an elaborate aerial delivery system using drone technologies); see
also Delivery by Drone in 30 Minutes? Amazon Says It’s Coming, L.A. TIMES (June 17,
2015, 2:29 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-amazon-drones-20150617-story.html
[https://perma.cc/2JVN-NC3A] (describing Amazon’s plans to use drones to quickly
deliver consumer products); Jack Nicas & Greg Bensinger, Delivery Drones Hit Bumps on
Path to Doorstep, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2015, 12:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/technical-hurdles-delay-drone-deliveries-1426867441 (describing drone delivery research
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assisted real estate photography23 and wedding photography24
continues to grow. Additionally, companies are using drones to help
monitor railway systems,25 pipelines,26 power lines,27 and other
infrastructure.
B.

An Overwhelmed FAA

The recent proliferation of civilian drones throughout the
country has brought with it a wide range of new policy issues. Some of
these issues relate to the threat of hazardous collisions between
drones and conventional aircraft.28 However, many other issues stem
from the growing incidence of conflicts between civilian drones and
activities on the ground. Individuals flying camera-fitted drones above
residential neighborhoods have disturbed sunbathers in their private
yards.29 Sports fans have flown drones into stadiums and interfered
conducted by Amazon.com, Inc., Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., Deutsche Post DHL,
Google, and other companies).
23. See Amrita Jayakumar, Using Drones to Sell Homes—Except in Washington,
WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-it/using-drones-tosell-homes--except-in-washington/2015/02/06/06f69320-a573-11e4-a06b-9df2002b86a0_story
.html [https://perma.cc/ZH2D-G466] (“Real estate agents across the country have become
enthusiastic adopters of drone technology, using the lightweight, camera-equipped
quadcopters to get creative with their marketing material.”).
24. See Matt McFarland, Drones: The Next Big Thing in Wedding Photography, or a
Tacky Intrusion?, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/innovations/wp/2015/02/24/drones-the-next-big-thing-in-wedding-photography-or-a-tackyintrusion/ [http://perma.cc/U9J7-7Y7N] (“Drones outfitted with a camera are increasingly
being used to document weddings as couples are drawn to the unique aerial perspective.”).
25. See David Z. Morris, Why BNSF Railway Is Using Drones to Inspect Thousands of
Miles of Rail Lines, FORTUNE (May 29, 2015, 2:18 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/05/29/bnsf
-drone-program/ [http://perma.cc/QH6Q-PQZ4] (describing BNSF Railway’s receipt of
FAA approval to use drones to more cheaply inspect its rail system to prevent derailments
and other potential safety problems).
26. See Jack Nicas, FAA Gives Approval to BP to Use Commercial Drones, WALL ST.
J. (June 10, 2014, 9:00 AM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/bp-launches-landmark-droneprogram-in-alaska-1402404549 (describing the FAA’s grant of regulatory approval for BP
to use drones to inspect its oil fields and pipelines near Prudhoe Bay, Alaska).
27. See Rebecca Smith, Utilities Turn to Drones to Inspect Power Lines and Pipelines,
WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2015, 11:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/utilities-turn-to-dronesto-inspect-power-lines-and-pipelines-1430881491 (noting that “unmanned aerial systems
can have tremendous value for utilities and other companies that must regularly inspect
hard-to-reach equipment”).
28. See Ashley Halsey III, $1.9 Million Fine Proposed for Firm’s Drone Activities,
WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2015, at A17 (“As of Sept. 27, the FAA had logged 920 reports of
drone sightings [in 2015]—most coming from commercial or general-aviation pilots.”);
Craig Whitlock, Rogue Drones Clogging U.S. Airspace, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2015, at A1
(describing more than seventy near encounters between drones and airplanes in the
United States during the first twenty days of August 2015).
29. See Tara Evans, Neighbors Complain of Drones Flying over Winter Park Back
Yards, CLICKORLANDO.COM (May 7, 2015, 8:33 AM), http://www.clickorlando.com
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with athletic events.30 Drones have crashed into houses31 and into
spectators at public parades32 and festivals.33 Individuals have also
intentionally sought to ground unwelcome drones hovering near
building fires,34 next to large arenas,35 or just outside their homes.36
Because the widespread use of civilian drone technologies is so new,
there are relatively few legal rules in place to address these conflicts.37

/news/florida/orange-county/neighbors-complain-of-drones-flying-over-winter-parkback-yards [http://perma.cc/UR8W-DQYN] (quoting a Florida resident alleging that a
drone flying in her neighborhood was “recording the teenager across the street, who lays
out in her front yard in her bikini”); Harriet Thurley, Flying Drone Films Woman
Sunbathing in Her Garden, COSMOPOLITAN (May 26, 2015), http://www.cosmopolitan.co.uk
/reports/news/a35960/drone-films-woman-sunbathing/ [https://perma.cc/6E6J-N2YU] (adding
that “Selena Gomez, Rihanna, Anne Hathaway and Jennifer Garner have also been
bothered” by drones).
30. See, e.g., Craig Whitlock, Rogue Drones at Sports Events Propel Concerns About
Safety, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2014, at A1 (noting that between August 2014 and
November 2014, “at least a half-dozen” drone sightings were reported at college or NFL
football games); Melanie Burney, Drone Spotted at Stadium During Phillies Game,
PHILLY.COM (June 2, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-06-02/news/62926148_1_philliesgame-drone-third-base-gate [https://perma.cc/F56T-YY5Q] (describing a flying drone inside
the stadium at a Philadelphia Phillies Major League Baseball game); Margaret Harding,
FAA Investigating Drone Spotted Flying Above Pirates Game at PNC Park, TRIBLIVE
(June 27, 2014, 4:41 PM), http://triblive.com/news/adminpage/6357452-74/game-dronepark [https://perma.cc/F56T-YY5Q] (reporting on a drone flying over a Pittsburgh Pirates
game).
31. See Jenna Portnoy, Drone Airspace: A Legal Frontier, WASH. POST, July 15, 2015,
at B1 (describing a drone’s collision into the front of a residential home in Fairfax County,
Virginia).
32. See Steve Annear, Drone Crashes on Parade Spectator in Marblehead, BOS. GLOBE
(May 26, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/05/26/drone-crashes-downspectator-during-memorial-day-parade/UFt2MohBZ9ZQZU49EcLsxN/story.html [https://
perma.cc/DM5X-C5UG].
33. See Haley Rush, Drone Hits Person at Albuquerque Festival, KRQE NEWS 13
(June 14, 2015, 10:49 PM), http://krqe.com/2015/06/14/drone-hits-person-at-albuquerquefestival/ [https://perma.cc/U78B-9SK4].
34. See Michael Franco, Watch Firefighters Blast Drone out of Sky with Hose, CNET
(June 10, 2015, 10:22 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/watch-firefighters-blast-drone-out-ofsky-with-hose/ [https://perma.cc/P9CK-U9LF] (describing firefighters’ seemingly intentional
use of a fire hose to spray a drone and prevent it from recording a house fire).
35. See Joseph Serna & Brian Bennett, Mystery Surrounds Drone That Flew Above
L.A. Kings Victory Party, L.A. TIMES (June 16, 2014, 3:19 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local
/lanow/la-me-ln-kings-game-drone-no-owner-20140616-story.html [https://perma.cc/7CURB4MR0].
36. See Douglas Ernst, Ky. Man Arrested After Shooting Down $1,800 Drone
Hovering over Sunbathing Daughter, WASH. TIMES (July 30, 2015), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/30/william-merideth-arrested-after-shooting-down-1800/
[https://perma.cc/27XL-69DU]; Jordan Graham, Huntington Beach Man Swats, Destroys
$1,350 Drone with His T-Shirt, ORANGE CTY. REG. (June 6, 2015, 7:55 PM), http://www
.ocregister.com/articles/drone-664910-flying-beach.html [https://perma.cc/5Y2K-9ZWH].
37. See Frank Vallese, New Rules Fuel the Growth of the Commercial Drone Industry,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 5, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/05/new-rules-fuel-the-growth
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Aware of the escalating need for laws to govern the domestic
drone industry, Congress enacted provisions in the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (“FMRA”) that instruct the
Secretary of Transportation to develop a regulatory structure for the
domestic drone industry.38 Since then, the FAA, which operates
within the United States Department of Transportation, has been
diligently working to formulate policies capable of facilitating safe
and orderly civilian drone activity.39 Unfortunately, despite its steady
efforts, sophistication, and long history of regulating manned flight,40
the FAA has failed to meet statutory deadlines for regulating drone
technologies.41 Meanwhile, thousands of potential commercial drone
technology users in the United States have had to wait on the
sidelines.42 By one estimate, the agency’s delays were costing the
nation $27 million in economic impact per day.43
-of-the-commercial-drone-industry/ [https://perma.cc/9CDD-MN2C] (“The view from the
industry is that the FAA’s final rules will successfully fuel the proliferation of drone
technology for non-recreational applications.”); infra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
38. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1), 126
Stat. 11, 73 (2012) (providing that the FAA shall “develop a comprehensive plan to safely
accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace
system”).
39. Id. § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat. at 73 (requiring the FAA to develop such policies “as
soon as practicable”).
40. See Jeffrey A. Berger, Comment, Phoenix Grounded: The Impact of the Supreme
Court’s Changing Preemption Doctrine on State and Local Impediments to Airport
Expansion, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 941, 963–67 (2003) (providing a detailed summary of the
history of regulating manned flight).
41. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 § 332(a)(3)(1), 126 Stat. at 73–
74 (identifying the deadline for the FAA to create a plan for the “integration of civil
unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system”); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. &
Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385, 400 (2015)
(same); Keith Wagstaff, FAA Misses Deadline for Creating Drone Regulations, NBC
NEWS (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:29 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/innovation/faa-missesdeadline-creating-drone-regulations-n437016 [https://perma.cc/8BV4-2XFH] (reporting
that the FAA had “failed to meet” its September 2015 deadline for creating a national
drone regulatory structure).
42. See, e.g., John Goglia, FAA Speeds up Small Drone Exemptions. But Why Not Just
Issue Blanket Exemption?, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2015, 8:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/johngoglia/2015/04/12/faa-speeds-up-small-drone-exemptions-but-why-not-just-issue-blanketexemption/#1437f8b24132 [https://perma.cc/5WJZ-6VUX] (describing the FAA’s initiation
of a summary grant process to accelerate its issuance of section 333 exemptions for
commercial drone uses and noting that, as a result, the agency meagerly increased to a
pace of just thirty such exemptions per week, “highlight[ing] the FAA’s problem in
regulating small drones on an individual basis . . . that are growing in popularity by the
thousands or even tens of thousands”).
43. See Matt Grosack, Stakes Are High for Domestic Drone Industry, DAILY BUS.
REV. (May 28, 2015), http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202727703584/Stakes-AreHigh-for-Domestic-Drone-Industry?slreturn=20160902140903 (citing figures from an
economic report by the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International).
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The FAA’s Attempts to Fly Solo

Rather than actively inviting state and local governments to join
in forming a coordinated drone regulatory system to address these
new and perplexing policy challenges, the FAA has thus far largely
opted to regulate drones on its own. Unfortunately, as civilian drone
use has expanded throughout the country, the nation’s burgeoning
volume of drone activity has made it increasingly impractical and
inefficient for the agency alone to carry this ever-growing regulatory
burden.44
In some instances, the FAA has responded to the growing
volume of drone regulatory work by proposing wide-sweeping rules
that strictly prohibit certain drone activities regardless of location.45
In other instances, the FAA has taken a converse approach,
weakening certain drone regulations in ways that reduce the agency’s
need to consider the locations where drones are proposed to fly.46
Regrettably, despite these and other efforts, the FAA continues to
have difficulty keeping up with the rapidly expanding drone industry.
Its struggles were on display once again in late 2015 as the agency
44. See Ben Popper, FAA Misses Deadline to Broadly Legalize Commercial Drones,
THE VERGE (Oct. 1, 2015, 12:02 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/10/1/9432353/faamisses-congressional-deadline-to-integrate-drones [https://perma.cc/9S9S-MTBW] (noting
that the FAA had granted more than 1,000 section 333 exemptions but that the “backlog
of applicants is building”).
45. The FAA’s long-awaited notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) on small
commercial drones (released in February 2015) proposed multiple drone restrictions that
give little or no consideration to the location where a drone is flying. See Operation and
Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544, 9544–46 (proposed
Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107). For example, the NPRM proposed
prohibitions on flying drones directly above individuals who are uninvolved with the drone
flight and prohibitions on flying drones beyond the operator’s or other designated
observer’s visual line of sight, even in areas where there are no people or potential hazards
below. See id.; see also Steven Miller & Nicole Witt, The Wild West of Commercial
Drones—Why 2015 Could Be a Pivotal Year in California, 38 CAL. PUB. L.J., no. 2, Spring
2015, at 1, 3–4 (summarizing major restrictions proposed in the February 2015 NPRM).
46. See, e.g., WILLIAM V. O’CONNOR ET AL., MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, CLIENT
ALERT: DRONES: FAA ANNOUNCES PATHFINDER PROGRAM TO EXPLORE BVLOS AND
URBAN DRONE OPERATIONS 1 (May 22, 2015), https://media2.mofo.com/documents
/150522dronefaapathfinder.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJZ6-2TV9] (stating that in March of
2015, the FAA began issuing broad “blanket” certificates of authorization (“COAs”) to
dozens of drone operators who had previously received certain FAA exemptions).
Recipients of these new COAs may operate their drones “anywhere in the country except
restricted airspace and other areas, such as major cities, where the FAA prohibits [drone]
operations.” See FAA Streamlines UAS COAs for Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=82245&omniRss=news_updatesAoc&cid=101_N
_U [https://perma.cc/2Q6J-WXVT] (last modified Mar. 24, 2015, 12:46:43 PM). These
blanket COAs essentially convert authorizations to fly drones in specific geographic areas
into authorizations to fly them almost anywhere in the United States. Id.
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scrambled to put a drone registration regime into place before the
holiday season, when retailers in the United States anticipated selling
hundreds of thousands of small drones.47 As the agency hastily rolled
out its registration system, critics expressed concerns about the
FAA’s use of an expedited rulemaking process and panned the FAA
for not initiating action much sooner.48
II. DRONES AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
While waiting for the FAA to formulate a federal drone
regulatory scheme, many states and municipalities have grown
increasingly impatient and have begun to enact their own drone use
restrictions.49 Aware of this uptick in state and local drone laws, the
FAA’s Office of the Chief Counsel issued a fact sheet in December
2015 reiterating the agency’s bold position that it holds broad
authority to preempt nearly all forms of state and local drone
restrictions.50 Although statutory language in section 336 of the
FMRA that took effect in August 2016 has led the FAA to be
somewhat more light-handed in regulating recreational drones, the
FAA continues to assert broad preemptive authority over both
recreational and commercial drone uses.51
47. See Craig Whitlock, In Shift, FAA Will Require Drones to Be Registered, WASH.
POST, Oct. 20, 2015, at A1 (reporting on the FAA’s plan to form a task force to generate
recommendations on a drone registration system and noting that American consumers
were expected to purchase more than 700,000 drones in 2015).
48. See, e.g., Eli Dourado, The Government Is Rushing out an Ill-Conceived Plan to
Regulate Consumer Drones, VOX (Nov. 12, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/11
/12/9716350/drones-obama-faa-christmas [https://perma.cc/6NC2-43ZF] (arguing that the
FAA’s perceived time pressure in getting registration rules into place is “entirely selfimposed” and noting that, “[i]n the past, courts have rejected the argument that the
urgent need to take action constitutes good cause for dispensing with notice and comment
when agencies themselves contributed to that urgency through prolonged inaction”).
49. See infra notes 173–79, 240–46 and accompanying text.
50. See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, STATE
AND LOCAL REGULATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) FACT SHEET 1
(Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=84369&omniRss=news
_updatesAoc&cid=101_N_U [https://perma.cc/3M7S-HXQ5] (explaining the FAA’s
regulatory framework). The December 2015 fact sheet only lists four specific examples of
drone-related regulations falling within the “police power” of state and local governments:
(1) requirements that police obtain warrants before using drones for surveillance; (2)
prohibitions against drone-assisted “voyeurism”; (3) prohibitions against drone-assisted
hunting or fishing or the use of drones to harass individuals who are hunting or fishing;
and (4) prohibitions on attaching weapons or firearms to drones. Id. at 3.
51. The FAA’s statements have also generated confusion regarding the extent to
which the agency’s authority over commercial drone use exceeds its authority over
recreational drone use. Congress has seemingly directed that the FAA treat these two uses
differently, and yet the agency’s own position on those differences is somewhat unclear.
Compare Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg.
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Given the unsettled nature of this debate, any serious discussion
about potential state and municipal roles in drone regulation must
therefore begin with an analysis of the federal preemption questions
that plague this evolving area of the law.
A simple example helps to highlight the great importance of
federal preemption issues to the future of drone regulation. Suppose
that the city council of Sunnyville, a hypothetical city in the United
States, adopted an ordinance restricting civilian drone flying over
certain neighborhoods where drones had been disrupting residents’
enjoyment of backyard patios and swimming pools.52 Suppose further
that, shortly after Sunnyville’s new drone ordinance became effective,
a large corporation received FAA authorization to make drone
deliveries throughout much of the United States—including
Sunnyville—so long as the company followed FAA rules. Then
suppose this powerful company, relying on this FAA authorization,

42,064, 42,081 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107) (expressly excluding
recreational drones from having to follow the requirements that small commercial drones
must follow), with FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 1–3 (describing a regulatory
framework for the FAA’s authority over drone usage that fails to distinguish between
commercial and recreational drone use). The FAA’s Small UAS Rule Part 107, for
example, sets forth extensive rules for the operation of small commercial drones, including
rules related to registration, pilot certification, visual line-of-sight requirements, and
operational limitations. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,064–194. Operators who fly drones for recreational use,
however, can choose whether they want to meet the requirements set forth under Part 107,
or instead follow the less burdensome section 336 of the FMRA. See FAA Modernization
and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336, 126 Stat. 11, 77–78 (2012); Operation
and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,064–194.
Additionally, section 336 of the FMRA expressly prohibits the FAA from “promulgat[ing]
any rule or regulation” regarding certain recreational drones, while also providing several
exceptions to this rule, including allowing the FAA to pursue enforcement actions against
those who “endanger the safety of the national airspace system.” FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012 § 336. The FMRA’s Special Rules for Model Aircraft—which govern
recreational use, specifically—also require drone operators to follow a community-based
set of safety guidelines, implying to some degree that Congress does not intend for the
FAA to preempt local authority over recreational drone use, at least. FAA Modernization
and Reform Act of 2012 § 336. However, the FAA does purport to regulate recreational
drones under the August 2016 “Registration and Marking Requirements for Small
Unmanned Aircraft,” seemingly under its authority over air safety. Operation and
Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,064–194. Although
both Congress and the FAA appear to limit federal regulation of drone use, especially
recreational drone use, the existence of exceptions allowing for more FAA regulation, the
promulgation of new FAA rules, and the FAA’s repeated assertions that it holds broad
authority continue to cause confusion about the extent of state and local government
authority in this area.
52. Such an ordinance is not purely theoretical. Multiple cities across the country have
contemplated adopting local restrictions on drone use over the past few years, and some
have already done so. See infra notes 173–79, 240–46 and accompanying text.
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began flying its drones over parts of Sunnyville where commercial
drone use was expressly restricted under the city ordinance. Under
this set of facts, would the FAA’s grant of authorization preempt
Sunnyville’s local ordinance, enabling the company to fly commercial
drones freely within areas restricted under the ordinance? And, as a
matter of policy, should FAA rules trump state or local laws in this
context?
Unfortunately, Congress has not provided definitive guidance
regarding the degree to which FAA rules should preempt state and
local drone laws. The general case law governing federal implied
preemption is inconclusive at best.53 Multiple commentators have
briefly weighed in on federal preemption questions relating to drone
regulation,54 and the FAA has expressed its own views on the topic,55
but courts have yet to squarely address these issues. If the FAA
indeed has broad power to preempt even the hypothetical Sunnyville
ordinance described above, discussions like those in this Article about
the potential roles of states and municipalities in drone regulation
could have limited practical value. Accordingly, this Part includes
rigorous legal and normative analyses of drone law preemption issues.
The analyses ultimately suggests that a well-structured federal, state,
and local drone regulatory system is legally defensible and could be
far more efficient and effective than a purely federal regime.

53. Other legal scholars have commented on the complexity and uncertainty
surrounding federal preemption law. See, e.g., Jamelle C. Sharpe, Toward (A) Faithful
Agency in the Supreme Court’s Preemption Jurisprudence, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 367,
367 (2011) (“Preemption has become one of the most frequently recurring and perplexing
public law issues facing the federal courts today.”).
54. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things
They Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57, 73 (2013) (observing that “FAA regulation of small,
low-flying drones does not preclude all state regulation” and that “Congress has not
created express statutory preemption of laws governing aerial surveillance, and has even
expressly nodded to exceptions to federal preemption in the field of aviation”); Miller &
Witt, supra note 45, at 6 (stating that it remains “unclear the extent to which a local agency
will be able to regulate the manner in which drones are used within their jurisdictions” as a
result of federal preemption uncertainty); Perritt & Sprague, supra note 41, at 437–39
(noting that “[d]rones present special challenges to simple extrapolation of traditional
federal preemption doctrine in the aviation field” and advocating that state and local
governments “have the power to regulate” drone operations occurring below an airspace
floor designated by the FAA).
55. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 1 (providing information to states and
localities regarding federal drone regulations and suggesting “careful[] consider[ation]
prior to any [state] legislative action to ensure that [state laws] are consistent with
applicable federal safety regulations”).
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A. Drone Law Preemption: A Legal Perspective
The FAA clearly possesses a substantial amount of regulatory
authority over civilian drone activity, at least within “navigable
airspace” and as the activity relates to “air safety” or “air
commerce.”56 But, as a legal matter, which aspects of drone regulation
fall exclusively within the FAA’s control? Tackling this question
requires analysis under three main preemption theories: express
preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption.57
1. No Express Federal Preemption
The federal government’s authority to preempt state and local
law generally derives from the supremacy clause—a provision in the
United States Constitution declaring that all federal laws “shall be the
supreme Law of the Land” and that “the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”58 The most straightforward
applications of this clause arise when Congress has enacted a federal
statute with language expressly preempting state or local laws.59 In
those contexts, the state and local laws at issue are expressly
preempted: Congress’s preemption language renders them “null,
void, invalid and inoperative.”60
Unfortunately, preemption questions can be much more difficult
and contentious in areas such as civilian drone law, where no express
federal statutory preemption language exists.61 Congress has not
56. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103(b)(1), 40104 (2012) (directing the FAA to “develop plans
and policy for the use of the navigable airspace and assign by regulation or order the use
of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace”
and describing the FAA’s authority over air commerce).
57. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 767
n.3 (1994). “Frustration preemption” is a fourth but less frequently acknowledged
preemption theory, allowing for preemption when “it would unduly frustrate the purposes
of [a federal] statute to permit concurrent state regulation.” Id. at 808 n.206. Because there
is no congressional language implying intent to give the FAA sole jurisdiction over every
aspect of drone regulation, there would seem to be minimal support for applying this
fourth theory in the context of civilian drones.
58. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
59. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (“[T]he provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter III shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .”).
60. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 279 (1987) (quoting Cal.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, No. 83-4927R, 1984 WL 943, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24,
1984), rev’d, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)).
61. See generally 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (lacking express federal preemption language). It
should be noted that at least one state has already rejected this idea and has enacted
legislation that expressly prohibits municipal governments from adopting their own local

95 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2016)

148

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

enacted legislation clearly directing that the FAA be the sole
regulator of every facet of civilian drone activity.62 Language in the
FRMA does order the agency to develop federal regulations for
drones; specifically, section 332(a)(1) of the FRMA instructs the
secretary of transportation—the cabinet officer to whom the FAA
directly reports—to “develop a comprehensive plan to safely
accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the
national airspace system.”63 However, neither that language nor any
other language in the FMRA expressly calls for federal preemption of
all state and local drone policies.64
2. Field Preemption Only Within a Correctly Defined Field
Given the absence of any express federal statutory language
preempting state and local drone laws, a more plausible basis for at
least some federal preemption might be the implied preemption
theory known as “field preemption.”65 Under the field preemption
theory, federal laws preempt state and local laws whenever a body of
federal statutes is so comprehensive that it unambiguously appears
that Congress intended for federal laws to exclusively “occupy” or
govern the entire regulatory field at issue.66 The FAA seems to rely

drone ordinances. See MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 14-301(b)–(c) (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (precluding municipalities from regulating drones and reserving
all regulatory jurisdiction over drone activity for the state and federal governments).
62. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1),
126 Stat. 11, 73 (2012) (directing the secretary of transportation to develop a plan for
drone operation in national airspace “in consultation with” various federal agencies and
actors in the drone industry).
63. Id.
64. At least one other commentator has taken note of the absence of express federal
preemption provisions precluding state or local drone regulatory activity. See Kaminski,
supra note 54, at 73. It is worth noting that the FAA included no preemption provision in
its February 2015 NPRM for civilian drones, in spite of alleged vigorous lobbying for such
a provision. William V. O’Connor et al., The Small Drones Rule: FAA Takes a Step in the
Right Direction, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), No. 32, Feb. 18, 2015, at 3
(observing that the FAA’s February 2015 NPRM for drones did “not propose an express
preemption provision, despite significant lobbying, including a formal petition filed with
the FAA, by certain groups for such a provision” and that “[t]his leaves open the
possibility that state and local governments may attempt to regulate UAS operations
differently from the manner proposed by FAA in the NPRM”).
65. For a useful explanation of the basic difference between express preemption and
field preemption, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227 (2000) (noting
that, “[e]ven in the absence of an express preemption clause, the [United States Supreme]
Court sometimes is willing to conclude that a federal statute wholly occupies a particular
field and withdraws state lawmaking power over that field”).
66. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); see also Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (stating that “a federal statute implicitly overrides state
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primarily on field preemption arguments to support its positions
regarding certain state and local drone regulation within “navigable
airspace” and cited multiple cases describing that theory in its
December 2015 fact sheet.67
Analyzing whether federal laws preempt state or local laws based
on field preemption generally involves what some commentators have
characterized as a simple two-prong test.68 The first prong asks
whether the field in question has traditionally been governed under
federal law rather than state or local law.69 If it has traditionally been
governed under federal law, then a court is more likely to find federal
field preemption.70 The second prong of a typical field preemption
analysis asks whether Congress intended to leave room for state or
local governments to supplement federal law in the field.71 If it is
evident that Congress intended not to leave such room, then field
preemption is more likely to be found.72
Regrettably, attempts to apply both prongs of this test in the
context of civilian drone regulation are quickly complicated by the
fact that the field at issue is not clearly defined. The FAA clearly
believes it has extremely broad jurisdiction over those aspects of
drone regulation that relate directly to protecting the safety and
efficiency of traditional manned aviation—a field over which the
agency undisputedly holds broad authority.73 However, several other
aspects of civilian drone regulation relate more to governing discrete,
small-scale, localized conflicts between drone operators and
individual landowners than to protecting conventional aviation.74
State and local laws aimed solely at addressing these sorts of conflicts
occurring very close to the ground and far from airports and manned
law . . . when the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy
a field exclusively”(citing English, 496 U.S. at 78–79))).
67. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 2–3.
68. See, e.g., Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A
Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 255 (2000) (describing the two-step test
for field preemption).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70, 73–74 (1941) (holding that federal
naturalization law preempted Pennsylvania’s naturalization law in part because the federal
government has always maintained supreme power over matters of foreign affairs).
71. See Weiland, supra note 68, at 255.
72. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (“Field preemption reflects
a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel
to federal standards.” (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249 (1984))).
73. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012) (giving the FAA the authority to implement and
enforce regulations necessary “to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of
[navigable] airspace”).
74. See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text.
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aircraft arguably fall outside any field that Congress intended to
reserve solely for the FAA.75
The FAA has effectively taken the position that its field of
expansive regulatory authority encompasses nearly every activity
involving objects moving above the ground.76 And at first glance,
federal legislation providing that the federal government “has
exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States” and instructing
the FAA to “develop plans and policy for the use of the navigable
airspace” might seem to support this stance.77 However, in reality,
Congress has not expressly defined “airspace of the United States.”78
Therefore, the FAA has conveniently opted to interpret the term to
encompass every inch of airspace above land, all the way to the
ground, at least when it comes to air safety regulation.79 These air
safety interpretations are so broad that, as one administrative law
judge observed, some are arguing that even the flight of a paper
airplane or a “toy balsa wood glider” could fall under the agency’s
jurisdiction.80 For similar reasons, under the FAA’s interpretation of
its own authority, even Marty McFly’s magnetic hoverboard in the
movie Back to the Future Part II could qualify as an aircraft flying
through national airspace, subject to FAA’s ever-reaching
regulation.81
75. Although the FAA has authority over more than just traditional manned aviation,
including authority over navigable airspace, air safety, and the safety of those on the
ground, these other bases of authority do not justify federal preemption over the kinds of
localized conflicts this Article suggests are better suited for regulation by state and
municipal governments. See § 40103(b).
76. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 1 (stating that “Congress has
vested the FAA with authority to regulate the area[] of airspace use, management and
efficiency, air traffic control, safety, navigational facilities, and aircraft noise at its
source”).
77. § 40103(a)(1), (b)(1).
78. See generally id. § 40102 (lacking definition of “airspace of the United States”).
Congress has defined “navigable airspace,” but the definition does not clearly identify
which areas are included therein. Id. § 40102(32) (defining “navigable airspace” as
“airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations . . . including
airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of aircraft”).
79. Busting Myths About the FAA and Manned Aircraft—Update, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=76381 [https://perma.cc/D969-Q774] (last
modified Mar. 7, 2014, 7:39:39 PM) (debunking myths about the FAA and declaring as
“fact” that the FAA “has broad authority” and responsibility for the safety of airspace in
the United States “from the ground up” and stating that some FAA regulations apply
“irrespective of the altitude at which the aircraft is operating”).
80. Pirker, Docket No. CP-217, at 3 (NTSB Mar. 6, 2014) (decisional order), http://
www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/Pirker-CP-217.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N4N-9ZX5].
81. BACK TO THE FUTURE PART II (Universal Pictures 1989). For general
information about the famed hoverboard appearing in the movie and continued attempts
to create a fully functional version of the device, see Jonah Bromwich & Daniel Victor, Why
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By conflating conventional, manned aviation activities with
essentially all other activities involving objects moving above the
ground, the FAA is seeking to rationalize its wholesale extension of
numerous well-established aviation law concepts to drones. Consider,
for example, the following statement set forth in the agency’s
December 2015 fact sheet:
If one or two municipalities enacted ordinances regulating
[drones] in the navigable airspace and a significant number of
municipalities followed suit, fractionalized control of the
navigable airspace could result. In turn, this ‘patchwork quilt’ of
differing restrictions could severely limit the flexibility of [the]
FAA in controlling the airspace and flight patterns, and
ensuring safety and an efficient air traffic flow. A navigable
airspace free from inconsistent state and local restrictions is
essential to the maintenance of a safe and sound air
transportation system.82
The FAA cites multiple cases involving conventional manned
aviation to support these statements—statements that are certainly
applicable to the extent they describe federal restrictions on drone
flights near airports or at higher altitudes where traditional aircraft
fly.83 However, the FAA’s rationale becomes far more questionable
when applied to regulations of small civilian drones traveling very
short distances, staying low to the ground, and far from ordinary air
traffic. Local drone restrictions like the Sunnyville ordinance
described above would not materially impact the FAA’s ability to
continue controlling conventional air traffic flight patterns or
maintaining safety near airports or aboard traditional aircraft and
thus arguably fall outside of the agency’s expansive regulatory field.84
States’ and municipalities’ long histories of regulating activities in
the low-altitude airspace where small civilian drones fly cast further
doubt on the notion that the FAA’s field of broad regulatory
jurisdiction engulfs that space.85 Consider, for example, the laws
implicated when a landowner seeks to construct a new building on a
parcel of land. Municipal zoning ordinances will likely restrict the
a ‘Back to the Future’ Hoverboard Never Took Off, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/business/why-a-back-to-the-future-hoverboard-never-took-off.html.
82. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 2.
83. Id. (first citing Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007); then citing
French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989); then citing Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012); and then citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1992)).
84. See supra text accompanying note 52.
85. See infra Section III.C.2.
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bulk and height of such a building, limiting the amount of low-altitude
airspace it may occupy.86 In some cities, local laws regulate building
contractors’ use of tall cranes within the parcel’s airspace during the
construction process.87 If portions of the new building ultimately
protrude into the airspace above neighboring parcels, neighbors may
have claims under state property law to compel removal of these
overhang encroachments.88 Furthermore, state or local laws may even
govern a small aerial fireworks display at the building’s grand opening
or the flying of small kites above the site.89 Although the FAA has
some limited regulatory jurisdiction over these sorts of activities,
including authority over air commerce, that jurisdiction has
historically extended only so far as is necessary to protect the safety
and efficiency of the sort of aviation that was regularly occurring
several decades ago when Congress passed the Federal Aviation
Act.90
If there were some compelling policy reason to broadly interpret
“airspace of the United States” as encompassing low-altitude space,
then the FAA might have a stronger argument for its expansive
interpretation of the term. For example, courts have long interpreted
the terms “navigable waterway” and “waters of the United States”
quite liberally under the Clean Water Act on the rationale that such
interpretations advance the nation’s strong public policy interest in
86. See, e.g., County of San Diego, Cal., Ordinance §§ 4600–4631 (May 2016),
http://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/dam/sdc/pds/zoning/z4000.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9Q8E-W8Y4]. In some instances, courts have upheld local governments’ regulatory
authority to impose height restrictions in the face of FAA preemption challenges, even
near airports. See, e.g., La Salle Nat’l Bank v. Cty. of Cook, 340 N.E.2d 79, 87–88 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1975) (holding that FAA regulations did not preempt a county zoning height
restriction and specifically stating that “the goals of the federal and local governments are
different” because “[t]he FAA is concerned with safe air traffic” while “the County is
concerned with the health, welfare and safety of people who live or work near an
airfield”).
87. See, e.g., Steel Inst. of N.Y. v. City of New York, 832 F. Supp. 2d 310, 325, 327, 331
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that New York City’s crane use restrictions aimed at protecting
the public were not preempted by federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration
regulations related to the use of cranes on jobsites to the extent that such laws were more
strict than federal ones and were aimed at protecting the public), aff’d, 716 F.3d 31 (2d Cir.
2013).
88. See generally L.C. Warden, Annotation, Mandatory Injunction to Compel
Removal of Encroachments by Adjoining Landowner, 28 A.L.R.2d 679, § 18 (1953)
(summarizing state court decisions ordering removal of overhanging wall encroachments).
89. 14 C.F.R. § 101.1(a)(2)–(3) (2015) (excluding aerial fireworks displays and kites
weighing less than five pounds from general FAA regulations).
90. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103, 40104 (2012) (describing the FAA’s authority over air
commerce). The widespread existence of local building setbacks and height restrictions is
one example of evidence of this limitation on the FAA’s exclusive jurisdiction over lowaltitude airspace. See infra Section III.C.2.
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aggressively addressing water pollution at its source.91 In contrast,
there is no compelling policy justification for expanding the scope of
“airspace of the United States” to include even the airspace below
our noses.
It seems far more plausible that Congress intended for “airspace
of the United States” to only encompass space regularly involved in
manned air flight—airspace near airports or situated at least 500 feet
above ground in most places.92 That sort of interpretation seems far
more consistent with the Supreme Court’s declaration in the famous
case United States v. Causby93 that a landowner owns “at least as
much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in
connection with the land.”94 In sum, the long history of state and local
laws regulating within low-altitude airspace and the lack of evidence
that Congress intended for the FAA to exclusively control all
activities in that space call into question the notion that a field
preemption theory justifies broad preemption of laws like the
Sunnyville drone ordinance described above.95 The Supreme Court’s
general hesitancy to find field preemption only further weakens these
arguments.96
Fortunately, the FAA appears to be beginning to recognize that
there are aspects of drone regulation that do not or should not fall
within its expansive jurisdiction. When the FAA issued its longanticipated Final Rule on Operation and Certification of Small
91. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132–33
(1985) (finding that “[p]rotection of aquatic ecosystems, Congress recognized, demanded
broad federal authority to control pollution” at the source of discharge and thus holding
that Congress purposely defined “navigable waters” broadly under the Clean Water Act
with an intent to “regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed ‘navigable’
under the classical understanding of [the] term”); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (West,
Westlaw through P.L. 114-244). It should be noted that the debate over precisely how
broadly to interpret “navigable waters” under various federal statutes rages on. See
generally Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the
“Navigable Waters” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,548
(2015) (providing a recent summary of courts’ activity in this area).
92. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(32) (defining “navigable airspace” as “airspace above the
minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations under this subpart and subpart III of
this part, including airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of
aircraft”); 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b)–(c) (2016) (defining the minimum safe altitude for aircraft
operations as 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle near “congested areas” and 500 feet
above the surface of “other than congested areas”).
93. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
94. Id. at 264.
95. See supra text accompanying note 52.
96. See Nelson, supra note 65, at 227 (noting that the United States Supreme Court
“has grown increasingly hesitant to read implicit field-preemption clauses into federal
statutes”).
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems in June of 2016, it intentionally excluded
a broad federal preemption provision from its pages.97 In the FAA’s
published “Discussion of the Final Rule,” the agency acknowledged
its decision not to include preemption language:
The FAA is not persuaded that including a preemption
provision in the final rule is warranted at this time. Preemption
issues involving small UAS necessitate a case-specific analysis
that is not appropriate in a rule of general applicability.
Additionally, certain legal aspects concerning small UAS use
may be best addressed at the State or local level.98
The FAA’s conscious constraint in its final rule is a promising sign
that even the agency itself is beginning to acknowledge that not all
drone activities do or should fall within its regulatory power.
3. Very Limited Conflict Preemption
In addition to field preemption, another set of rules, categorized
in this Article as “conflict preemption”99 theories, provide another
conceivable ground for implied federal preemption of some state and
local drone laws.100 Establishing conflict preemption generally
requires a showing that it would be “impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements” or that the state or
local law in question “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”101
Conflict preemption theories could certainly provide a basis for
federal preemption of some limited categories of state or local drone
97. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed.
Reg. 42,064, 42,064–194 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107).
98. Id. at 42,194.
99. See Nelson, supra note 65, at 227–28 (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,
79 (1990)) (defining “conflict preemption” and explaining that “even if a federal statute
contains no express preemption clause, and even if it does not impliedly occupy a
particular field, it preempts state law with which it ‘actually conflicts’ ”).
100. Id. Some commentators make a distinction between “conflict preemption” and
“obstacle preemption,” which is also sometimes termed “frustration of purpose”
preemption. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 727, 739 (2008). Others categorize these two similar types of preemption together.
See id. (explaining that “[s]ome writers collapse [conflict preemption and frustration of
purpose preemption] into one, which they tend to call conflict preemption—the point
being that the difference between conflict and frustration of purpose relates only to how
sharp the tension is between federal and state law” (citation omitted)). For simplicity, and
because the distinction does not seem material enough to warrant separation in this
instance, this Article embraces the latter approach and treats these two varieties of
preemption theory as one in the same.
101. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (quoting Freightliner Corp.
v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
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regulations.102 For example, if the FAA were to establish uniform
nationwide manufacturing requirements for new drones, a state or
local regulation calling for different drone features might well be
unenforceable based on a conflict preemption rationale.103 Similar
federal manufacturing standards serve valuable functions in other
industries, enabling manufacturers to design products that are salable
in every state.104
However, it is doubtful that conflict preemption would be
grounds for broad FAA preemption of local drone use restrictions
comparable to the Sunnyville ordinance described above.105 Such local
drone ordinances would not necessarily stand as obstacles to the
FAA’s objective of protecting the safety and efficiency of manned
flight; drone operators who comply with federal drone restrictions
and keep their devices at low altitudes and far from airports and
helicopters could simultaneously comply with Sunnyville’s additional
restrictions on where or when drones may fly. And the “patchwork
quilt” of local restrictions that might result from allowing such local
drone laws would arguably be no different than the degree of local
variation that has long existed in automobile traffic laws.106 Contrary
to Amazon’s recent assertions,107 most commercial drone flying
involves short flights that are less likely to routinely cross interstate
boundaries and do not necessarily qualify as inherently interstate

102. See O’Connor et al., supra note 64, at 3 (stating that “[a]bsent an express
preemption provision in the [FAA’s] final rules [regarding drones], . . . state and local
regulation would not be foreclosed at the threshold, but would instead have to be analyzed
under existing conflict preemption principles on a case-by-case basis” (citation omitted)).
103. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 3 (drawing similar conclusions and
stating that state or local laws “[m]andating equipment or training for UAS related to
aviation safety such as geo-fencing would likely be preempted”).
104. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1561–63 (2007) (describing “federal
requirements concerning product design or engineering” as “[m]ore common and more
defensible” than most other forms of federal preemption).
105. See supra text accompanying note 52.
106. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 2 (asserting that a “ ‘patchwork
quilt’ of differing restrictions [on drones in navigable airspace] could severely limit the
flexibility of FAA in controlling the airspace and flight patterns, and ensuring safety and
an efficient air traffic flow”).
107. Hearing on Drones: The Next Generation of Commerce? Before the Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 6 (2015), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content
/uploads/2015/06/Amazon-Misener-HOGR-Testimony-Pkg-6-17-15-rev.pdf [https://perma.cc
/X3Y4-HYLB] (testimony of Paul Misener, Vice President for Global Public Policy,
Amazon.com) (arguing that states and localities should be precluded from restricting the
flights of FAA-authorized drones “given the interstate nature of commercial [drone]
operations”).
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activities.108 Neither conflict preemption nor any other preemption
argument has precluded state or municipal regulations of automobile
driving, which routinely involves trips of a couple of hundred miles or
more on a single tank of gas.109 Accordingly, claims that express
preemption, field preemption, or conflict preemption theories justify
broad preemption in the drone law context seem tenuous at best.
B.

Drone Law Preemption: A Normative Analysis

Given the unsettled state of legal questions surrounding federal
preemption of state and local drone law, it is worthwhile to conduct a
“functional,” or normative, analysis of these issues as well.110 Over the
years, legal academics have identified several types of situations in
which federal preemption of state or local law tends to promote
favorable policy outcomes.111 They have likewise described multiple
situations in which it tends to be more advantageous to preserve state
or local lawmaking authority against preemption challenges.112 As
described below, this academic literature suggests that an optimal
regulatory system for drones would allocate regulatory authority
among federal, state, and local governments.
1. Regulatory Floors Versus Regulatory Ceilings
The distinction between “floor” preemption and “ceiling”
preemption is particularly useful in examining the policy implications
of drone law preemption. Federal regulatory floors are federal laws
that create a baseline level of regulation, preempting any state or
local laws that are less stringent than the federal standards.113 For
example, federal regulations generally require that children aged

108. See Matt Burns, Parrot’s Newest Drone Packs a Serious Camera, Extreme Range,
TECHCRUNCH (May 11, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/05/11/parrots-newest-dronepacks-a-serious-camera-extreme-range/ [https://perma.cc/53SY-K88C] (describing a new
drone model’s two-kilometer range as “extreme”).
109. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
110. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82
TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1223 (2004) (“Functional analysis supplements consideration of text,
history, and precedent and seeks solutions to difficult doctrinal questions by asking what
makes sense from a policy perspective.”).
111. See infra Section III.A.
112. See generally Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation: Dividing the Local from the
State in Congressional Decision Making, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 351 (2012)
(providing a more thorough summary of goals favoring and disfavoring preemption).
113. See Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1554 (defining federal regulatory floors as laws that
“preclude less stringent state and local regulation, but allow for additional and more
stringent regulation”).
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thirteen and younger wear life jackets when aboard recreational
boats—a regulatory floor that creates a minimum standard, applicable
in all fifty states.114 However, this federal requirement does not
preclude state governments from imposing more stringent laws that
regulate beyond the federal floor and require life jackets for older
passengers, as some states have done.115 Floor preemption approaches
can be appealing from a public policy perspective because they give
states and municipalities flexibility to impose additional rules based
on local needs and preferences, and the ability to experiment with
innovative new regulatory strategies.116 In Professor William Buzbee’s
words, the flexible dynamic achievable through federal floors can
offer distinct advantages, preserving the “benefits of multiple
regulatory voices, protections, and diverse regulatory modalities.”117
Floor preemption is often contrasted with regulatory “ceiling”
preemption118 or “federal unitary choice preemption.”119 This less
common and more controversial category of preemption largely
precludes states or localities from imposing supplemental regulations
on an activity or industry.120 There are certainly situations in which
nationally uniform rules offer such sizable benefits that ceiling

114. See 33 C.F.R. § 175.15(c) (2015).
115. See, e.g., IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 26.01.30.050.01(f) (2015) (“Children fourteen
(14) years of age and younger, onboard vessels nineteen (19) feet or less, must wear an
approved flotation device when the vessel is underway.”).
116. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (popularizing the “laboratories of democracy” theory, in which a “single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory[] and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”).
117. See Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1555.
118. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective
on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 583 (2008) (contrasting regulatory floors and ceilings);
Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 1283, 1303 (2013) (suggesting that “absent clear evidence of a congressional purpose
to adopt unitary standards or an obvious conflict or obstacle to a clearly defined
regulatory program, courts and agencies should generally favor floor preemption over
ceiling preemption in the context of energy statutes”); Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands
on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change
Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 736 (2010) (describing the advantages of regulatory
floors over ceiling preemption). This floor-ceiling dichotomy has grown particularly
commonplace among scholars in the environmental law arena, often citing Professor
William Buzbee’s writings on the topic. See, e.g., Glicksman & Levy, supra, at 258; Alice
Kaswan, Climate Adaptation and Land Use Governance: The Vertical Axis, 39 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 390, 451 (2014); Rossi & Hutton, supra, at 1288, 1301.
119. See Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1558 (observing that the term “ceiling” can be a
misnomer when describing preemption rules that effectively preclude state and local
regulation).
120. Id. at 1559.
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preemption is a useful and appropriate regulatory tool.121 However, in
many instances, ceiling preemption approaches can unjustifiably
displace state and local government regulations that were far better
tailored to local needs and preferences.122 For example, a 2010 case
held that certain federal manufacturing standards for air conditioners
preempted Albuquerque’s more environmentally responsible
standards, highlighting the potential hazards of this sort of
preemption.123 Federal ceiling preemption arguments can provide an
avenue for powerful industry stakeholders to lobby for and secure
self-serving, excessively lenient federal laws that shield them from
more stringent state or local regulations.124
Federal ceiling regulations are particularly problematic when
applied to inherently local activities. For instance, the fireworks
industry and fireworks fanatics might heartily favor a federal law
allowing consumers in all fifty states to legally use small aerial
fireworks and preempting state and local restrictions on such use.
Such a law would give companies operating within that industry
broad license to operate throughout the country and would spare
them from having to worry about more restrictive state or local laws.
However, such an approach would likely be disadvantageous from a
public policy perspective. Among other things, it would prohibit
states and municipalities from tailoring fireworks laws to suit their
own unique circumstances. Such flexibility is important in the case of
consumer firework regulation because the scope and severity of
fireworks’ impacts likely varies tremendously based on local factors
such as population density or localized drought conditions.125

121. See infra notes 131–33 and accompanying text (alluding to some of the possible
policy justifications for regulatory ceilings, including establishing nationwide uniform
standards and protecting national security interests and assets).
122. See Buzbee, supra note 104, at 1569. In his article on the topic, Professor Buzbee
adds that unitary federal choice preemption strategies are “likely to be a disaster” from a
social welfare perspective and are “particularly vulnerable to regulatory failure.” Id. at
1597, 1599.
123. See Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Inst. v. City of Albuquerque, 835
F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1137 (D.N.M. 2010).
124. See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation:
The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1505–06 (2007) (“[W]hat will
industry demand from Congress? It will demand a federal standard that preempts
inconsistent state regulation and eliminates regulatory uncertainty. Uniformity is not
enough, however. Industry will also try to undercut the most aggressive state standards by
seeking a lower federal ceiling.”).
125. See, e.g., Tom Moore, Amid Drought and Wildfires, Fourth of July Fireworks Are
Banned in Parts of West, WEATHER.COM (June 30, 2016, 5:46 PM), https://weather.com
/news/news/fireworks-ban-hot-dry-fires-west [https://perma.cc/X3G7-PVKT] (describing how
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Accordingly, no federal fireworks law creating this sort of undesirable
ceiling preemption exists. Instead, the federal government has
adopted regulatory floors for consumer fireworks and allows states
and municipalities to independently determine whether and how to
impose more stringent restrictions.126
2. Justifiable Regulatory Floors
How might this floor versus ceiling distinction inform the present
preemption debate over civilian drone regulation? First, it is worth
noting that several types of federal regulatory floors relating to
drones seem easily justifiable from a policy perspective. Consider, for
instance, FAA regulations requiring that civilian drones stay below a
certain altitude and away from airports and helicopters.127 So long as
these sorts of regulations leave room for states and localities to
impose additional drone use restrictions, they exemplify the
regulatory floor approach. Such rules further the FAA’s
congressionally mandated objectives of promoting the safety and
efficiency of manned aviation.128 However, they also preserve the
ability of states and localities to craft more stringent drone use rules
based on local needs.
Federal regulatory floors could also be justifiable as a way for the
FAA and other federal agencies to protect national interests and
assets against drone-related threats. For example, such agencies are
likely justified in imposing federal restrictions on drone activities near
or above national parks;129 Washington, D.C.;130 and critical national

drought conditions in the western United States in the summer of 2016 prompted many
state and local governments to impose special fireworks restrictions).
126. See 35 C.J.S. Explosives § 11 (2009) (stating that a “county ordinance regulating
storage and use of explosives is not preempted by federal statutes regulating explosives,
even if the ordinance imposes more stringent requirements” (citing S. Blasting Servs., Inc.
v. Wilkes Cty., 162 F. Supp. 2d 455, 462 (W.D.N.C. 2001), aff’d, 288 F.3d 584, 590 (4th Cir.
2002))).
127. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed.
Reg. 42,064, 42,211 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107); see also Fly for
Fun, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/model_aircraft/ [https://perma.cc
/VDS2-TWUR] (last modified July 21, 2016, 12:05:25 PM) (providing further details on
the FAA’s restrictions on flying drones and model aircrafts).
128. See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012); infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text
(describing the FAA’s congressional mandates).
129. See Mark Berman, National Park Service Bans Drone Use in All National Parks,
WASH. POST (June 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014
/06/20/national-park-service-bans-drone-use-in-all-national-parks/ [https://perma.cc/92SWK4D5] (stating that the National Park Service banned drones in all of its parks due to
“concerns about the negative impact that flying unmanned aircraft is having in parks”).
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security sites. If a city ordinance contained more lenient provisions
that expressly authorized drone activity in one of these nationally
important areas, it would be appropriate for federal restrictions to
preempt those ordinance provisions.
3. Justifiable Regulatory Ceilings
Federal regulatory ceilings that preclude certain types of state or
local drone laws may also be justifiable in some contexts. As
mentioned, a ceiling preemption approach may be necessary to
preserve nationwide uniformity in drone manufacturing or
performance standards—an area of drone law where such
standardization offers substantial efficiency advantages.131 Federal
laws already mandate certain specified features of passenger aircraft
sold within the United States, sparing manufacturers from having to
meet fifty different sets of standards.132 For similar reasons,
comparable nationwide standardization in the drone context would
help to reduce manufacturing costs and could thereby benefit
consumers. Federal uniform drone tracking and registration
requirements would likewise offer distinct policy advantages and
justify preemption of conflicting state or local laws.133
4. The Advantages of Greater State and Local Involvement
However, outside of those limited areas where federal regulation
is justified lie several other aspects of civilian drone activity that have
distinctly local impacts and thus warrant at least some localized
130. See 14 C.F.R. § 93.341(a) (2016) (prohibiting flying aircrafts over the Washington,
D.C., without FAA authorization); see also FAA: Washington DC is a No Drone Zone,
FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (June 30, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=
83267 [https://perma.cc/98C5-T9AA] (stating that restrictions on the airspace around
Washington, D.C., establish a “national defense airspace” for homeland security reasons).
131. It should be noted that even unitary federal choice preemption based on this
“nationwide standardization” rationale can generate undesirable policy outcomes. The
Energy Policy Conservation Act (“EPCA”) and its capacity to preempt more stringent
energy efficiency requirements under state and local building codes illustrates this risk.
See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide Products Revisited:
Federalism, Green Building Codes, and Appliance Efficiency Standards, 34 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 335, 356 (2010) (describing how the EPCA “presents potential roadblocks to
municipal green building codes that include increased appliance efficiency standards”).
132. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 23.1 (2016) (establishing federal airworthiness standards for
different types of airplanes). See generally Thomas N. Tarnay, Aircraft Designs Subjected
to FAA Special Certification Review—Mitsubishi MU-2 and Beechcraft Bonanza: The Role
of the SCR in Aircraft Design Certification and Implications on Federal Preemption, 62 J.
AIR L. & COM. 591, 597–98, 601–07 (1996) (providing a useful overview of the federal
standards for the design, production, and maintenance of manned aircraft).
133. See infra Section III.A.2.
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regulation. A ceiling preemption approach, like the one suggested in
the FAA’s December 2015 fact sheet, is difficult to justify from a
policy perspective; it would preclude states and municipalities from
imposing supplemental drone use restrictions that address these
inherently local issues.
Simple analogies to other areas of the law help to emphasize this
point. There is no federal land use administration equivalent to the
FAA through which citizens in every city in the country must seek
approval for real estate development.134 Nor is there a federal
automobile driving administration that manages traffic flows and sets
speed limits for every road in all fifty states.135 The nation’s federal
system wisely allows for state and local officials, which tend to have
greater geographic proximity to and information about the
predominantly local impacts of these sorts of activities than federal
officials, to be the primary regulators of these activities.136 Like land
development and automobile driving, civilian drone activity’s impacts
can vary greatly by location and thus benefit from the precision
available through localized governance. Entrusting regulatory
authority to subnational governments in these areas also creates
“laboratories of democracy”—a vast array of uniquely situated
policymakers brainstorming and experimenting with various
approaches to drone regulation on a relatively small scale.137 This
experimentation can be a valuable tool for accelerating policy
innovation in areas—including the civilian drone industry—that
involve new and rapidly changing technologies.
III. ENVISIONING A COORDINATED FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL
DRONE REGULATORY SYSTEM
For the aforementioned reasons, involving states and
municipalities in the regulation of civilian drones seems both legally
134. See generally 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016) (stating that the authority to
enact zoning ordinances and the manner in which they may be enacted are delegated to
local governments).
135. See generally Highway Safety Laws by State, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY
ASS’N, http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/bystate/ [https://perma.cc/GJ5X-7Z8V] (providing
a listing of automobile administration agencies and highway safety laws by state).
136. See, e.g., Road Rules, N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.ncdot.gov/programs
/ghsp/ [https://perma.cc/2KM6-8DXM] (listing highway safety laws that drivers in North
Carolina must follow, including seat belt and litter laws).
137. See New St. Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “one of the happy incidents of the federal system [is] that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory[] and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”).
AND PLANNING § 1:9,
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defensible and normatively advantageous. But which specific areas of
drone regulation seem best suited for implementation by the federal
government, and which would be better implemented at lower levels
of government? As highlighted in this Part of the Article, some
specific areas of the civilian drone industry are best suited for
regulation at the federal level, the state level, and the local level,
respectively.
The existing federal, state, and local regulatory regime for land
development offers a useful starting point for developing a
coordinated structure to regulate civilian drones. At the federal level,
a handful of federal standards regulate such matters as the protection
of endangered species and their habitats to prevent states from
engaging in a “race to the bottom.”138 Above this federal regulatory
floor, state laws govern numerous other land development issues such
as the allocation of property rights in land and the protection of
wetlands.139 Municipal governments then operate atop both the
federal and state floors, exercising wide discretion in determining
precisely where and under what conditions various types of land
development may occur within their jurisdictions.140 Most states’
zoning enabling acts delegate land use regulatory and zoning
authority to local governments, integrating municipalities into a
broader regulatory system in which each level of government plays a
role.141 This multi-layered regulatory approach seems to have
governed land development relatively well for several decades.
What might a corollary regulatory structure look like for drones?
The following Sections identify the major elements of a
comprehensive drone regulatory scheme that seem most appropriate
for implementation at the federal, state, and local levels.
138. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2015); see also Rancho
Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that the
“[a]pplication of the [Endangered Species Act] to habitat degradation has a further impact
on interstate commerce by removing the incentives for states ‘to adopt lower standards of
endangered species protection in order to attract development,’ thereby preventing a
destructive ‘race to the bottom’ ” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130
F.3d 1041, 1049, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).
139. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West, Westlaw through ch. 175 of
the 2016 Legis. Sess.); see also ENVTL. L. INST., STATE WETLAND PROTECTION: STATUS,
TRENDS & MODEL APPROACHES 9–36 (Mar. 2008), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files
/eli-pubs/d18__06.pdf [https://perma.cc/645B-CM8W].
140. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 388 (1977) (stating that there are few legal doctrines for
“limiting the range of municipal discretion”).
141. See generally RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 134, § 1:9 (stating that the authority to
enact zoning ordinances and the manner in which they may be enacted are delegated to
local governments).
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A. Drone Laws Most Suitable for the Federal Government
Federal regulators unquestionably have a vital role to play in
regulating civilian drone activity in the United States. Having served
as the nation’s chief aviation regulator for nearly a century, the FAA
has unparalleled resources and expertise in several areas related to
drone use.142 Additionally, the agency’s position within the federal
government could enable it to facilitate valuable nationwide
uniformity within certain aspects of drone regulation.
1. Uniform Design and Performance Standards
As already suggested, federal regulations would be the most
efficient and effective way to establish uniform drone manufacturing
standards and specifications that are enforceable in all fifty states.
Much like the existing federal performance and safety standards for
automobiles, a set of uniform drone performance and safety
standards would give civilian drone manufacturers certainty and
clarity regarding the specifications their products must meet to be
eligible for sale anywhere in the country.143 Courts have long
recognized that a compelling need for uniform, nationwide rules can
be reason enough to vest regulatory authority over certain activities
solely with the federal government.144 Nationwide drone
manufacturing standards, which would prevent the formation of a

142. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed.
Reg. 9,544, 9,545 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (purporting the FAA’s “experience with the
certification, exemption, and [Certificate of Waiver or Authorization] process” to be part
of the basis for its authority to regulate non-recreational drone use); see also Berger, supra
note 40, at 965–71 (describing the FAA’s formation and the considerable scope of its
power).
143. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 200–01
(2015) (suggesting that the FAA could promulgate federal manufacturing standards for
civilian drones comparable to federal motor vehicle manufacturing and safety standards).
See generally 49 C.F.R. § 571 (2015) (setting forth federal manufacturing standards for
automobiles).
144. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1890) (“Where the subject matter
[to be regulated] requires a uniform system as between the States, the power controlling it
is vested exclusively in Congress, and cannot be encroached upon by the States . . . .”).
Commentators have also noted the potential advantages of federal regulatory activity in
contexts in which national uniformity is particularly important. See Alan N. Greenspan,
The Constitutional Exercise of the Federal Police Power: A Functional Approach to
Federalism, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1049 (1988) (arguing for federal rulemaking in
instances “[w]hen national uniformity facilitates interstate transactions in a way that
individual state regulation cannot”).
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varied patchwork of state-level standards, would seemingly fall well
within this principle.145
For example, federal drone manufacturing standards might
someday require that all new drones have collision avoidance or
“sense and avoid” systems, enabling the devices to detect other
physical objects and automatically adjust course to avoid them.146
Such standards might also require return-to-home or other lost-link
emergency response features that preprogram drones to respond in
safe ways if they lose a wireless connection with their operator,147 or
anti-hacking software to help prevent third parties from using
counterfeit electromagnetic signals to hijack the devices mid-flight.148
Federal drone manufacturing standards might also eventually
require that all drones made available for sale in the United States
include software and hardware features to ensure their compatibility
with a nationally-standardized geofence system. A growing number of
drone manufacturers—including DJI, the world’s largest civilian
drone producer—already embed geofence software into many of their
drones.149 This software uses GPS technologies to create invisible
“fences” that prevent the company’s drones from flying into the

145. See supra text accompanying note 131 (acknowledging that there is a need for
uniform nationwide rules to regulate drones).
146. At least one major drone manufacturer has already developed a “sense and
avoid” system for one of its newer drones. Ben Popper, DJI Just Released Its First Drone
That Can See and Avoid Obstacles, THE VERGE (June 8, 2015, 9:45 AM), http://www
.theverge.com/2015/6/8/8745415/dji-guidance-system-matrice-100-sense-avoid [https://
perma.cc/XWX9-JLXX] (describing drone manufacturer DJI’s new drone guidance
system as a “combination of ultrasonic sensors and stereo cameras that allow the drone to
detect objects up to 65 feet (20 meters) away and keep your aircraft at a preconfigured
distance”).
147. See generally Jack Nicas, What Happens When Your Drone Escapes, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 9, 2014, at B1 (providing information on technological issues with drones such as the
drones losing connections with their operators, and discussing the industry efforts to
address these problems through new functions like return to home features).
148. See Christian de Looper, Drones Now Big Hacking Target; First Drone Malware
Identified, TECH TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles
/30634/20150204/drone-hacking-next-big-security-concern.htm [https://perma.cc/MU8K
-7R9V] (reporting that hacking is a growing issue with drones as there is a “thriving
community of drone hackers[,]” and that there are “several open source projects available
such as Skyjack which use[] your drone to take over the drones around it”).
149. See Tim Moynihan, Things Will Get Messy If We Don’t Start Wrangling Drones
Now, WIRED (Jan. 30, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/things-will-getmessy-if-we-dont-start-wrangling-drones-now/ [https://perma.cc/ZZK7-V69U] (stating that
multiple drone manufacturers have put geofencing systems into place); see also Nick
Lavars, DJI Launches New Software to Block Drones Wandering into Dangerous Areas,
NEW ATLAS (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.gizmag.com/dji-drone-software-geofencing/41123/
[https://perma.cc/5SEB-SDCA] (describing DJI’s geofencing software).
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airspace near thousands of airports across the world.150 When a drone
approaches a “geofenced” area, software within the drone
automatically reduces the drone’s power and prevents it from
entering the restricted space.151 Wireless signals can even remotely
update drones’ geofence software from time to time to revise or add
new geofenced areas.152 Uniform laws established by the federal
government could most easily ensure that all new drones sold in the
country were compatible with such a nationwide system.153
As a legal matter, rules establishing drone performance and
geofence compatibility standards would likewise seem well within the
FAA’s regulatory jurisdiction because of the agency’s congressional
mandate to protect the safety of aircraft.154 Among other things,
preserving such safety involves reducing the risk that a civilian drone
will fly into other objects in the air. It also involves preventing drones
from flying near airports or within “navigable airspace”—the space
more than 500 feet above the ground in most places that serves as a
sort of federal public highway for manned air travel.155 FAA rules
150. See Brian Fung, You Won’t Be Able to Fly This Hugely Popular Drone in D.C.
Much Longer, Thanks to That White House Crash, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/01/28/a-simple-software-update-could-haveprevented-a-drone-from-buzzing-the-white-house/ [https://perma.cc/A9RS-RD2F] (reporting
that drone manufacturer DJI’s geofence database already blocks its newer drones from
3,500 airports and that the company is working to expand the database to cover more than
10,000 airports around the world).
151. See id. (stating that when a drone is within 1.5 miles of a geofenced area, it will
automatically be grounded and unable to fly).
152. See, e.g., DJI Introduces New Geofencing System for Its Drones, DJI (Nov. 18,
2015), https://www.dji.com/newsroom/news/dji-fly-safe-system [https://perma.cc/XG8V
-NK4C] (stating that for DJI manufactured drones, updated information on drone flight
restrictions will be sent to DJI drone operators using the DJI GO application).
153. At least one congressman has publicly advocated for mandatory federal geofence
features. See Jake Swearingen, 1 Million Drones Will Be Sold This Christmas, and the FAA
Is Terrified, POPULAR MECHANICS (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.popularmechanics
.com/flight/drones/news/a17535/the-faa-is-terrified-that-1-million-drones-will-be-soldthis-christmas/ [https://perma.cc/985G-DZPQ] (quoting Oregon Congressman Peter
DeFazio who has argued that small civilian drones “should be set up so they can’t be sold
unless they’re geo-fenced for altitude and perimeters”).
154. See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012) (stating that the FAA shall develop policies “to
ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace”).
155. Id. § 40103(32) (defining “navigable airspace” as “airspace above the minimum
altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations under this subpart and subpart III of this part,
including airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of aircraft”); see also
Major Walter S. King, The Fifth Amendment Takings Implications of Air Force Aircraft
Overflights and the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Program, 43 A.F. L. REV. 197,
199 (1997) (observing that Congress established navigable airspace in order to “provide
the public with rights to the airspace above the United States[,]” and stating that the Civil
Aeronautics Authority determined the “minimum safe altitudes of flight,” and therefore
the navigable airspace, “to be 500 feet above ground level”).

95 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2016)

166

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

requiring that all new drones have the basic features described above
and be compatible with a nationwide geofence system could do much
to help further those congressionally mandated goals by making it
easier to keep drones out of restricted areas.
2. Federal Drone Registration and Tracking Systems
The federal government is likewise well-positioned to establish
drone registration and tracking software requirements capable of
enabling law enforcement officers and others on the ground to
identify the owners of airborne drones. Many civilian drones can fly a
considerable distance away from their operators, making it difficult to
identify operators of the devices while they are in flight.156 Databases
already enable patrol officers on roads to retrieve information on
licensed motor vehicles, including out-of-state vehicles, using license
plate information.157 However, since many civilian drones are much
smaller than cars and can fly hundreds of feet above the ground, any
aluminum license plate mounted on such a drone would be difficult
for observers on the ground to read.158 Fortunately, federal drone
registration requirements and a national, GPS-supported tracking
system could eventually allow patrol officers and others throughout
the nation to quickly access identifying information for any drone.
Legislators in the United Kingdom recently proposed similar
electronic identification requirements for drones.159 In December of
2015, the FAA introduced its own web-based national registration

156. See Michael Zhang, FAA Testing Tech That Locates Drone Owners Flying
Illegally Near Airports, PETAPIXEL (Oct. 8, 2015), http://petapixel.com/2015/10/08/faatesting-tech-that-locates-drone-owners-flying-illegally-near-airports/ [https://perma.cc/5N63276E] (stating that one of the FAA’s biggest challenges is locating drone operators, and
describing technology that could “pinpoint exactly where the operator is located while the
drone is in the air”).
157. See, e.g., License Plate Search, WIS. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://trust.dot.state.wi.us
/pinq/pinqservlet?whoami=pinqp1 [https://perma.cc/228B-7VYY] (providing a publicly
searchable database for motor vehicle license plates).
158. See Tom Simonite, License Plates for Drones Could Make Rogue Operators
Accountable, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s
/540391/license-plates-for-drones-could-make-rogue-operators-accountable/ [https://perma
.cc/74SV-WK5E] (describing potential problems with attaching license plates to drones
such as the license plates only being visible to the naked eye if they are less than 100
meters away).
159. See Robert Wall, U.K. Politicians Call for Tracking of Drone Flights, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 4, 2015, 7:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-k-calls-for-tracking-of-drone-flights
-1425513662 (reporting that Parliament members sought new drone tracking system
requirements partly as a way to “avoid having safety concerns stifle an industry considered
to have huge potential for job creation”).
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system for all operators of drones weighing more than 250 grams.160
Under the new system, registrants for both commercial and
recreational drones must obtain a unique registration or serial
number and affix the number directly onto their drones.161
Registration requires providing name, address, and contact
information, making it easier to identify drone owners and operators,
as well.162 Although this approach does not make it possible to
identify owners or operators of drones while they are flying high in
the air, it could be a valuable first step toward such a system.
3. Restrictions That Protect Federal Assets and Interests
For the reasons described above,163 there are also compelling
legal and policy justifications for federal restrictions on drone activity
above or near nationally important sites and security infrastructure.
The National Park Service (“NPS”) has already imposed restrictions
to address growing concerns about drone uses within national parks.
In 2014, NPS announced a temporary ban on drones flying above
eighty-four million acres of NPS-controlled waters and lands.164 These
restrictions fall squarely within the agency’s regulatory authority,
given its legislatively created role as the nation’s protector of these
scenic and historic sites.165 For homeland security purposes, the FAA
has likewise declared Washington, D.C. and all space within a thirtymile radius of the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport to be
a “No Drone Zone” in which drone flying is greatly limited.166
For analogous reasons, the FAA or other federal agencies could
be well justified in restricting drone flying near national borders, on
national public lands, near nuclear energy or military facilities, or in
the vicinity of other important national security areas. Given the
inherently national nature of the interests protected under such
160. Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, 80 Fed.
Reg. 78,593, 78,646 (Dec. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 48).
161. See id. at 78,647–48.
162. See id.
163. See supra Section II.B.
164. See Mike M. Ahlers, National Park Service Bans Drones over Safety, Noise
Worries, CNN (June 21, 2014, 11:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/20/travel/nationalpark-service-drone-ban/ [https://perma.cc/DGH6-J663].
165. See 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014) (stating that the purpose of the NPS is to
“conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life” at national park sites
“and to provide for the enjoyment” of those sites).
166. See No Drone Zone, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/no_drone
_zone/dc [https://perma.cc/S22U-DF6B] (last modified June 14, 2016, 2:02:57 PM)
(providing more information on the FAA’s No Drone Zone designation affecting the D.C.
area).
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restrictions, it would seem sensible to enforce them under federal law,
as is already sometimes done.167 Geofences could eventually be useful
tools for helping to enforce these sorts of restrictions as well.
B.

Drone Laws Most Suitable for State Governments

In contrast, several other drone regulatory tasks are arguably
better suited for lower levels of government. The following Section
discusses those tasks that could seemingly be addressed most
effectively through state regulation.
1. Privacy and Safety Rules to Protect Landowners
State governments are arguably in a better position than the
FAA to craft laws aimed at protecting citizens on the ground from
many of the safety and privacy risks associated with civilian drones.
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reserves a
substantial amount of regulatory authority to state governments.168
States routinely exercise this authority—commonly known as the
“police power”—to enact laws in a wide range of areas aimed at
promoting the general health, safety, and welfare of their citizenry.169
Such state laws often sit atop federal regulatory floors, helping to
govern activities ranging from automobile driving170 to hunting171 and
lighting fireworks.172
Much of the recent flurry of state drone legislation throughout
the country is classifiable as police power regulation. For instance,

167. For example, the FAA already limits drone flying near “military operation areas.”
See Airspace Restrictions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly
/airspace_restrictions/ [https://perma.cc/5C3G-EP84] (last modified July 14, 2016, 11:49:58
AM).
168. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.”).
169. See Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “police
power” as “[a] state’s Tenth Amendment right . . . to establish and enforce laws protecting
the public’s health, safety, and general welfare, or to delegate this right to local
governments”).
170. See generally Highway Safety Laws by State, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY
ASS’N, http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/bystate/ [https://perma.cc/6DB4-NUBX] (providing
a user-friendly summary of automobile traffic laws by state).
171. See generally Where to Hunt: Hunting Info for Every State, NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS
FOUND., www.wheretohunt.org [https://perma.cc/ND9J-DU7Q] (providing convenient access
to state hunting laws and regulations).
172. See generally Directory of State Laws, AM. PYROTECHNICS ASS’N, http://www
.americanpyro.com/state-law-directory [https://perma.cc/N3DN-RTGP] (providing a detailed
listing of fireworks restrictions by state).
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statutes recently enacted in Florida,173 Idaho,174 and North Carolina175
create civil causes of action against citizens and state agencies who
use drones to conduct intentional surveillance of individuals or
property, and Texas classifies recording surveillance of a person or
real property without permission, including recordings from drones,
as a misdemeanor.176 Drone statutes enacted in other states restrict
the use of drones for certain purposes, such as hunting or interfering
with legal hunting.177 These new state statutes represent the
beginnings of what could ultimately become a full body of state-level
drone safety and privacy laws. They are evidence that state
legislatures are already engaged in valuable policy experimentation
for this new and growing industry. Fortunately, the FAA appears to
have recently acknowledged that many such laws fall within a state’s
police power authority;178 it now seems undisputed that states enjoy at
least some discretion to tailor these sorts of drone laws to fit the
needs and preferences of their own jurisdictions.179

173. See FLA. STAT. § 934.50(3) (2015) (prohibiting law enforcement agencies from
using a drone “to gather evidence or other information”).
174. See IDAHO CODE § 21-213(2) (LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting a
“person, entity or state agency” from using “an unmanned aircraft system to intentionally
conduct surveillance of, gather evidence or collect information” about an individual, an
individual’s curtilage, or an agricultural industry, without written consent).
175. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-300.1 (2015) (prohibiting a “person, entity, or State
agency” from conducting surveillance of a person or private real property without the
person’s consent, with exceptions for newsgathering and certain instances for law
enforcement).
176. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of
84th Legis.). See generally id. § 423.002 (providing exceptions to restrictions on droneassisted photography and filming for such activities as “professional or scholarly research,”
military exercises, and natural gas or electric utility operations).
177. See IDAHO CODE § 36-1101(b) (LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting
hunting with an “unmanned aircraft system” or using an unmanned aircraft to “molest, stir
up, rally or drive in any manner any of the game animals or game birds of this state”);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.40112(2)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of
98th Legis.) (prohibiting the use of unmanned vehicles “to affect animal or fish behavior in
order to hinder or prevent the lawful taking of an animal or a fish”); id. § 324.40111(5)
(prohibiting the use of unmanned vehicles to “take game or fish”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14401.24 (2015) (prohibiting hunting or fishing with a drone). See generally Current
Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES. (Aug.
16, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-lawlandscape.aspx [https://perma.cc/JPC5-GS5V] (describing hunting-related state drone laws).
178. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 3 (listing examples of police power
laws that are not subject to federal preemption, including warrant requirements for droneassisted police surveillance, prohibitions on drone voyeurism, prohibitions on droneassisted fishing or hunting, and prohibitions on the attachment of firearms or weapons to
drones).
179. This is not to ignore that Congress has granted the FAA the power to ensure the
“safety of aircraft” in “navigable airspace.” 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (2012).
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2. Clarifications of Landowners’ Airspace Rights
State governments are also best positioned to clarify certain
questions of state property law that have grown increasingly relevant
with the recent proliferation of drone technologies. Chief among
these are questions regarding the extent to which landowners are
entitled to exclude drones from flying at low altitudes directly over
their parcels. Should landowners be legally entitled to exclude
unwanted objects from hovering a mere two feet above their
backyards? What if an object hovers at twenty feet? What if it hovers
at 200 feet? Away from airports and below altitudes where airplanes
routinely fly, these questions about the scope of landowners’ rights in
low-altitude airspace have very little to do with regulating interstate
commerce, establishing nationwide uniformity, or protecting manned
aviation; they are primarily issues of state property law.180
Property law has long recognized that owners of real property
hold more than mere rights in the surface of a parcel; they have
interests in at least some of the airspace immediately above the
surface as well.181 State condominium laws further reinforce this
doctrine, governing landowners’ rights to convey interests in specific
portions of their airspace to others by deed.182 However, laws in most
states offer relatively little guidance regarding the extent of
landowners’ rights to exclude unwanted objects such as drones from
the low-altitude airspace directly above their land.183 The common
law rules applicable to this issue in most states rely upon vague,
nuisance-like balancing tests to address conflicts between flying
objects and landowners.184 These fuzzy rules may have adequately
governed such conflicts prior to the civilian drone era, but they are
becoming increasingly inadequate as the incidence of conflicts
between landowner and drone operators grows.185
180. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (stating that “[p]roperty
interests are created and defined by state law”).
181. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33-102 (LEXIS through 2016 Legis. Sess.)
(recognizing the ownership of condominiums “to consist of a separate estate in an
individual air space unit of a multi-unit property together with an undivided interest in
common elements”). See generally Donna S. Bennett, Condominium Homeownership in
the United States: A Selected Annotated Bibliography of Legal Sources, 103 L. LIBR. J. 249
(2011) (providing a useful primer on condominium law).
183. See Rule, supra note 143, at 182–86 (discussing variations in property law for lowaltitude airspace).
184. See id.
185. See id. at 169–74 (describing how drone technologies are raising questions in such
areas as aerial trespass, takings, and Fourth Amendment limitations on law enforcement
searches).
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Large corporations such as Amazon186 and Alphabet187 that are
interested in offering drone-assisted delivery services in the United
States would benefit greatly if the FAA were to eliminate rather than
clarify landowners’ rights to exclude in low-altitude space. They could
likewise benefit if federal laws broadly preempted municipal
authority to regulate drone activities in that space, allowing
companies with federal drone use authorizations to ignore most state
and local drone use restrictions. Expanding drone delivery
throughout the country could be less complicated and expensive for
these companies if the FAA were to establish sole control over lowaltitude airspace and leave minimal room for aerial trespass claims or
state or local drone use restrictions.188 However, such a sweeping,
unsubstantiated, federal “unitary choice preemption” approach to
landowner airspace rights laws would also arguably orchestrate one of
the largest uncompensated transfers of property interests in United
States history.189 Millions of Americans would lose valuable rights to
prevent unwanted devices from physically invading the airspace just
above their backyards and rooftops, receiving almost nothing in
return.
Ironically, prevailing property theory principles suggest that the
growing conflicts between drone operators and landowners over the
use of low-altitude airspace call for an opposite policy response: that
of strengthening and clarifying landowners’ property interests in that
space.190 State statutes that better defined landowners’ respective
186. See Jacob Pramuk, Drone Battle’s Next Front: Your Local Government, CNBC
(Dec. 24, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/23/drone-battles-next-front-yourlocal-government.html [https://perma.cc/CL7T-XY5W] (reporting that Amazon declared
that “states and localities must not be allowed to regulate small drones that the FAA has
authorized”).
187. See Hope King, Google X Hopes to Launch Drone Deliveries by 2017, CNN (Nov.
2, 2015, 4:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/02/technology/google-drone-delivery/
[https://perma.cc/U5KR-RQUR] (describing “Project Wing,” a project of Alphabet’s tech
lab Google X, that is developing technologies for drone-assisted product deliveries).
188. See Cecilia Kang, Localities Object as F.A.A. Asserts Drone Authority, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2015, at B1 (stating that tech companies would benefit from “[a]ny
rollback . . . of local drone regulations” and reporting that “[c]ompanies such as Amazon
and Google have hired dozens of lobbyists over the last year to visit aviation committees
on Capitol Hill” and that these “companies want a light touch by regulators to help give
their drone efforts the widest possible latitude”).
189. See supra notes 118–24 and accompanying text (explaining difficulties surrounding
“federal unitary choice preemption”); see also infra note 193 and accompanying text.
190. A handful of states have enacted statutes that seemingly affirm landowners’
substantial airspace rights. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 659 (West, Westlaw through 2016
Reg. Sess.) (“Land . . . includes free or occupied space for an indefinite distance
upwards . . . subject to limitations upon the use or airspace imposed, and rights in the use
of airspace granted, by law.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-9-9 (2015) (“The owner of realty has
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entitlements in low-altitude airspace and established that those
entitlements ran with the land would make it easier for parties to
negotiate drone-related covenants and easements involving that
space.191 Communities could more easily incorporate private drone
use rules into their covenants, conditions, and restrictions.192
Municipal governments would operate under greater legal certainty
when purchasing or condemning airspace easements for “drone
corridors” above private land. And such statutes could potentially
even help to simplify certain criminal law and takings law questions
arising from the use of drone technologies.193
Several state legislatures have already enacted laws providing
that landowners have at least some rights to exclude drones from the
airspace directly above their parcels. An Oregon statute enables
landowners to recover treble damages for injuries caused when
private citizens fly unwelcome drones less than 400 feet above their
land.194 Additionally, a Nevada statute creates civil liability for drone
operators who fly less than 250 feet above private property after the
underlying landowner objects.195 Clear signals from the FAA that it
intends to embrace a regulatory floor approach and not seek to
preempt such state laws would go far in encouraging other states to
enact similar legislation.

title downwards and upwards indefinitely; and an unlawful interference with his rights,
either below or above the surface, gives him a right of action.”); MINN. STAT. § 360.012.2
(LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“The ownership of the space above the lands . . . of this
state is declared to be vested in the several owners of the surface beneath, subject to the
right of flight . . . .”). See Rule, supra note 143, at 179–86 (providing a recent analysis on
this topic).
191. For a full description of the Coasean concept that clearly exhibited how landrelated entitlements can facilitate more efficient bargaining, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 112 (1985) (“Not only must initial entitlements be
assigned, but rules by which the entitlements are legally protected must also be
established.”).
192. Private covenants that regulate the exterior colors of buildings, the placement of
TV antennas, roof-mounted air conditioning units, and other conspicuous items serve
similar functions. See generally David L. Callies, Common Interest Communities: An
Introduction, 37 URB. LAW. 325 (2005) (describing the use of private covenants in
residential settings).
193. See Rule, supra note 143, at 171–74 (describing takings law and Fourth
Amendment questions arising from drones, and discussing how uncertainty regarding
landowners’ rights to exclude drones from airspace above their parcels is complicating
those questions).
194. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.380 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
195. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 493.103 (West, Westlaw through 78th Reg. Sess. & 29th
Spec. Sess. of 2015).
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3. State Registration and Operator Licensing Programs
One other regulatory task that arguably suits state governments
well is that of assisting the FAA in administering registration and
licensing programs for civilian drones and drone operators. In
December of 2015, the FAA introduced its first-ever federal
registration requirements for noncommercial drones weighing less
than fifty-five pounds.196 Unfortunately, these new requirements
involve little more than paying five dollars, providing some basic
contact information, clicking through some disclosures, and affixing a
unique serial number to each registered drone device.197 No
knowledge test or live interaction with a government official is
required.198 Already, these new registration rules have been criticized
as being potentially unenforceable199 and as doing too little to address
the safety and privacy risks associated with civilian drones.200
Fortunately, state governments throughout the nation have
motor vehicles divisions and offices that already handle a large
volume of registrants each year.201 These offices help to ensure that
automobiles registered within a given state meet state and federal

196. See Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, 80
Fed. Reg. 78,593, 78,593–648 (Dec. 16, 2015) (to be codified in scattered parts of 14
C.F.R.).
197. See id. at 78,645–48. See generally Welcome to the Small Unmanned Aircraft
System (sUAS) Registration Service, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://registermyuas.faa
.gov/ [https://perma.cc/YXN5-3EXP] (providing more information about the registration
process).
198. See Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, 80
Fed. Reg. at 78,645–48.
199. See, e.g., Seung Lee, Is the FAA’s Drone Registration Program Legal?,
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 23, 2015, 4:10 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/faas-drone-registrationprogram-legal-408701?piano_t=1 [https://perma.cc/VSX3-WKRQ] (describing a Florida
attorney’s legal challenge to the validity of the new FAA registration requirements for
small civilian drones).
200. See, e.g., Editorial Board, Opinion, The Government’s Plan to Register Drones
Doesn’t Go Far Enough, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/the-governments-plan-to-register-recreational-drones-doesnt-go-far-enough
/2015/10/26/bd21aac8-79c5-11e5-a958-d889faf561dc_story.html [https://perma.cc/DE9YYTVV] (arguing that the FAA’s drone registration rules are “not nearly enough” to
address issues associated with the nation’s rapidly rising volume of civilian drone
activities).
201. See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Table 1-16: Retail(a) New Passenger Car Sales
(Thousands of Units), U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot
.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_16.html [https://
perma.cc/4LXR-XG26] (last updated Oct. 2015) (reporting that approximately 7,585,000
new passenger cars were purchased in the United States in 2013, the vast majority of which
would presumably need to be registered in state agency offices).
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safety and performance requirements and are registered and plated.202
Such offices could also serve as convenient places for citizens and
businesses to register drones or to renew drone registrations based on
periodic drone safety and performance inspections. The sheer volume
of new drone sales in the United States is already far more
comparable to that of new automobile sales than to that of new
manned airplane or helicopter sales.203 Accordingly, a cooperative,
federalism-based approach to drone registration that utilizes the
FAA’s expertise and leverages existing state resources might be
policymakers’ best chance at affordably implementing a truly robust,
meaningful drone registration program.204
For the hundreds of thousands of drones manufactured and sold
before safety and performance requirements for registration go into
effect, states and the FAA could create a Class B registration option
that allows some limited use of these noncompliant devices. Such a
tiered regulatory system, which has analogs in land use zoning205 and
automobile registration realms,206 might help to appease owners of
preexisting nonconforming drones without unduly sacrificing the
safety of manned aircraft and of individuals on the ground.
State governments might also be well-positioned to assist with
the licensing of drone operators. The FAA’s proposed federal drone

202. See generally Residency Requirement for First Time California Driver License and
Identification Card Applicants, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www
.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv [https://perma.cc/4MS9-NCZ6] (providing information about the
types of valuable functions that motor vehicles division offices typically perform).
203. See Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Table 1-12: U.S. Sales or Deliveries of New Aircraft,
Vehicles, Vessels, and Other Conveyances, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.rita.dot.gov
/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01
_12.html [https://perma.cc/E7WS-TVZK] (last updated Apr. 2016) (reporting that less
than 3,000 new aviation aircrafts are delivered for sale in the United States in a typical
year). But see Michal Addady, The Number of Drones Expected to Sell During the
Holidays Is Scaring the Government, FORTUNE (Sept. 29, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://fortune.com
/2015/09/29/drones-holiday-sales/ [https://perma.cc/YN23-GBQ9] (reporting that United
States retailers were expected to sell more than one million small drones in the 2015
holiday season alone).
204. See generally Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91
IOWA L. REV. 243, 283–85 (2005) (providing a basic overview of “cooperative
federalism”).
205. See generally Deepa Varadarajan, Billboards and Big Utilities: Borrowing LandUse Concepts to Regulate “Nonconforming” Sources Under the Clean Air Act, 112 YALE
L.J. 2553, 2566–68 (2003) (discussing the treatment of preexisting nonconforming land
uses under zoning law and legal and policy rationales for such treatment).
206. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 25 (McKinney, Westlaw through July 2016)
(describing distinct, more restrictive rules for “limited use vehicles” in New York that do
not meet conventional automobile registration requirements).
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operator licensing system for commercial drone fliers could easily
become overwhelmed if the industry continues to rapidly expand.
Consider, for instance, the “knowledge test” requirement for
commercial drone operators, loosely described in the FAA’s notice of
proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) that was released in February of
2015.207 How does the FAA plan to administer these tests and
facilitate the licensing of the potentially tens of thousands of drone
operators per year who may soon be seeking them?208 The agency’s
proposed procedures, which are significantly less onerous than
conventional pilot licensing procedures, are arguably more akin to
automobile driver licenses than to conventional FAA pilot licenses.209
Given these strong similarities, why not explore the possibility of
using state government resources to help administer these licensing
programs?
Most state governments already have well-established licensing
procedures for automobile drivers.210 These often include driving tests
and written or computer-assisted applicant exams designed to ensure
that licensed individuals are adequately educated about traffic laws
and trained to drive competently and safely.211 One can easily imagine
comparable licensing procedures administered through state motor
vehicle division offices that use many of the same government
resources presently used for driver license certification and testing.

207. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. FAA-2015-0150, Notice No. 1501, Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems 107–10 (Feb. 15,
2015), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/recently_published/media/2120
-AJ60_NPRM_2-15-2015_joint_signature.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PTT-JQ2L].
208. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Developing DROP
Discipline: Training and Testing Operators of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 7
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 143 (2015) (discussing the issue of drone operator licensing in
detail).
209. See, e.g., Kelsey D. Atherton, The Future of Urban Planning: Zoning for Drones,
POPULAR SCI. (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/future-urbanplanning-zoning-drones [https://perma.cc/EQ3B-A3QJ] (drawing similar parallels between
drone flying and automobile driving by quoting urban designer Mitchell Sipus as stating
that drone flying is “not really that different than regular automobile traffic”).
210. See, e.g., Requirements for a California Driver License (FFDL5), STATE OF CAL.
DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES (June 2016), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/?1dmy
&urile=wcm:path:/dmv_content_en/dmv/pubs/brochures/fast_facts/ffdl05 [https://perma.cc
/M886-74T9] (providing California’s requirements for obtaining a driver license).
211. See, e.g., DMV’s Driving Test (FFDL 22), STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR
VEHICLES (May 2012), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/brochures/fast_facts
/ffdl22 [https://perma.cc/QUD5-HAWY] (describing California’s physical driving test
requirement); see also Samples of Driver License Knowledge Tests, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T
OF MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/interactive/tdrive
/exam [https://perma.cc/92LS-342Y] (providing information regarding California’s written
driver license test requirement covering state traffic laws).
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North Carolina has already enacted a statute establishing a state-level
commercial drone operator licensing program.212 Among other things,
North Carolina’s statute requires that commercial drone operators be
at least sixteen years of age, have a valid driver’s license, and pass a
drone flying knowledge test to obtain an operator license.213
Operating a drone for commercial purposes in North Carolina
without this license is a Class 1 misdemeanor.214 As North Carolina’s
statute shows, there is no compelling reason for such requirements to
be implemented and enforced solely at the federal level.215
C.

The Need for Municipal Government Involvement

Although federal and state governments are well equipped to
handle much of the nation’s drone regulation, some drone regulatory
tasks are so inherently local in nature that local governments are
better suited to manage them. Municipalities, holding land use
regulatory authority under state zoning enabling acts,216 are arguably
authorized under those same statutes to regulate activities in the
airspace just above the ground as well. The subsections below
describe why involving local governments in drone regulation could
allow for a degree of precision and efficiency that are otherwise
unattainable.
1. Access to Firsthand, Local Information
Municipalities’ access to firsthand information about the unique
preferences and attributes of their communities makes them essential
contributors to any comprehensive drone regulatory system.
Consider, for example, a simple policy decision of whether and under
what conditions to permit civilian drone activity in the low-altitude
airspace above a particular city neighborhood. If the neighborhood is
212. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-96 (2015) (requiring permits for the commercial
operation of an unmanned aircraft system).
213. See Act of July 1, 2016, ch. 90, sec. 14.5(b), § 63-96(b), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws __, __
(to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-96(b)).
214. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-96(e).
215. See Christopher Simmons, The Drone Act of 2016: Calif. Assemblyman Mike
Gatto Announces Consumer Aviation Measure, CAL. NEWSWIRE (Jan. 13, 2016), http://
californianewswire.com/the-drone-act-of-2016-calif-assemblyman-mike-gatto-announcesconsumer-aviation-measure/ [https://perma.cc/D35J-5JH8] (announcing the California State
Legislature’s consideration of its own bill that would require drone owners to have
insurance policies and tiny electronic license plates for their devices).
216. See FISCHEL, supra note 192, at 22 (“Zoning is one of the community’s ‘police
powers[,]’ ” and “[t]his broad regulatory authority is derived by the municipality from the
state government. In most cases a special enabling act, patterned after a standard act
promulgated in the 1920s, gives the locality the power to zone.”).
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situated near an airport or important security site, then federal
agencies should obviously have authority to restrict or prohibit
nearby drone use. Beyond that, however, municipalities are better
equipped than federal agencies to gather and process the information
relevant to determining where and when drones should be permitted
to fly. Is the neighborhood filled with single-family homes, secluded
private patios, and backyard pools? Or is it merely a collection of old
warehouses in an industrially zoned area of town? Unlike the FAA,
the nation’s thousands of local governments have this sort of
information at their fingertips and use it on a regular basis to make
land use regulatory decisions and to otherwise tailor policies to fit the
needs of their own communities.
2. Longtime Regulation of Other Airspace Uses
The long history of municipalities regulating other activities in
low-altitude airspace is yet another compelling reason to involve them
in the nation’s regulatory structure for drones.217 Many new small
civilian drones are programmed to hover primarily in the layer of
airspace that rests just above a community’s buildings, trees, and
other grounded structures;218 building setbacks, height restrictions,
and other common municipal ordinance provisions already regulate
uses of that same space.219
Building height restrictions and setbacks benefit landowners, in
part, by giving them greater long-term certainty regarding the scope
and degree of their seclusion from neighbors. For example, suppose
that a landowner who is installing a backyard pool purposefully
situates the pool area on the lot and designs it such that neighbors in
nearby homes cannot peer through their windows and watch the
homeowner’s family swim. Local setbacks and height restrictions can
217. See, e.g., County of San Diego, Cal., Ordinance § 4600 (May 2016), http://www
.sandiegocounty.gov/content/dam/sdc/pds/zoning/z4000.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q8E-W8Y4].
218. A growing number of drone manufacturers are embedding software into new
drones with preprogrammed maximum altitude limits of 400 feet. See, e.g., Lance Ulanoff,
Yuneec Typhoon H Drone Is Full of Awesome Power and Frustrating Complexity,
MASHABLE (July 7, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/07/07/yuneec-typhoon-h-dronereview/#oGGkrz8Ab5q9 [https://perma.cc/GY5W-LYL4] (noting that one new drone’s
“angle mode” is the least restrictive and allows it to “go to its max 400-foot altitude”);
Phantom 3 Professional- Flight Limits and No-Fly Zones, DJI, http://wiki.dji.com/en/index
.php/Phantom_3_Professional-_Flight_Limits_and_No-Fly_Zones [https://perma.cc/ZZ6V
-2WG7] (last modified Dec. 3, 2015 9:28 PM) (noting that the DJI’s Phantom 3 drone is
pre-programmed to have a maximum height limit of 400 feet).
219. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in a Green Economy, 59 UCLA L. REV. 270, 284–85
(2011) (describing how building setbacks and height restriction ordinances limit the use of
low-altitude airspace).
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make it much more difficult for neighbors to renovate nearby homes
in ways that threaten the privacy-protecting elements of this
homeowner’s pool design. From an academic perspective, these sorts
of land use restrictions effectively designate the low-altitude airspace
near the homes involved as a “conservation commons,”220 enabling
the space to serve as a valuable seclusion buffer that reciprocally
benefits residents below.221
By keeping eyes, ears, and noises out of low airspace, height
restrictions, setbacks, and similar regulations help to protect citizens’
investments in pool walls, privacy hedges, privacy fences, and other
types of seclusion-driven land development designs. However, as
drone activity—a “rival” use of the same low-altitude space—
becomes more commonplace, it increasingly interferes with
landowners’ longtime use of the space as a seclusion buffer.222 With
the increasing affordability of drones, the cost-related barriers that
have enabled low-altitude airspace to serve this valuable seclusion
function for decades are quickly evaporating. Low-cost, cameramounted drones—readily available at big box stores throughout the
country—are now enabling ordinary citizens to gain access to visual
vantage points into backyards and other private land areas that were
previously attainable only aboard helicopters or manned airplanes
with FAA-licensed pilots. In much of the country, this emerging
threat to privacy surely exceeds any threats the devices might pose to
manned air flight.223 And local government officials seem better
positioned than the FAA to determine which of these two competing
airspace uses—drone activity or preservation of seclusion—to
prioritize in each specific neighborhood.
220. See id. at 296–97 (characterizing height-restricted airspace as a “conservation
commons”); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and
Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 39 (2003) (describing conservation commons as
“commons whose most efficient use is nonuse”).
221. See Rule, supra note 221, at 285 (describing bulk and height restrictions as
“reciprocal in that they require nearly all neighboring landowners to give up those same
rights and nearly all landowners get the same general benefit from the restrictions” and
suggesting that because of this reciprocal nature, such restrictions “generally respect
existing airspace rights”).
222. See id. at 294–95 (distinguishing between “rival” and “nonrival” airspace uses and
detailing the economic analysis of low-altitude airspace).
223. See, e.g., Mike Nolan, As Popularity of Drones Takes off, More Limits on Where
They Can Fly, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 25, 2016, 3:28 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs
/daily-southtown/news/ct-sta-drone-restrictions-st-0122-20160125-story.html [https://perma
.cc/8QMP-TPCY] (quoting Tim McCarthy, the police chief of Orland Park, Illinois, as
stating that the city’s “No. 1 concern was privacy” in enacting a drone use restriction
ordinance, and that “[p]eople don’t want to have a camera looking at them on their
property”).
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3. Unique Capacity to Craft Location-Specific Rules
One other argument supporting greater municipal involvement
in drone regulation is that recent advancements in drone technologies
necessitate a location-sensitive regulatory approach that only
localities are equipped to effectively establish and enforce. Courts
and policymakers relied upon similar sorts of arguments to justify the
emergence of municipal land use controls—and, ultimately, zoning
laws—nearly a century ago.
In the late nineteenth century, most municipal governments in
the United States did relatively little to regulate land use within their
communities. During that era, common law nuisance claims and
private covenants were the primary means of balancing competing
land uses among neighbors.224 Most of the nation’s predominantly
rural and low-density communities had no pressing need for more
regulation than that.225 However, advancements in building
techniques and other technological and social changes occurring
shortly thereafter sparked a period of rapid urbanization.226 Many
cities quickly grew larger and more crowded, generating an
unprecedented volume and degree of conflicts among neighbors.227
Rather than relying on the federal government to address these
new challenges, municipalities began implementing their own policies
aimed at promoting safer and more efficient land use.228 For example,
in an effort to mitigate urban fire risks, the city of Boston adopted an
ordinance in 1906 that imposed varying building height restrictions
depending on whether land was in a predominantly commercial or
residential area.229 Other cities in the late nineteenth century began
adopting ordinances to prohibit potentially disruptive land uses from
certain predominantly residential areas; many of these local
ordinances seemed largely reactionary in nature.230 For example,
complaints about the smells of slaughterhouses prompted ordinances
224. RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 134, § 1:1 (detailing the history of land use disputes
and nuisance litigation).
225. See id.
226. See id. § 1:2.
227. See Rule, supra note 219, at 284–85 (detailing how urbanization and
advancements in high-rise building construction fueled landowner conflicts).
228. See ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 112 (1977) (stating
that the “introduction of zoning in 1916 and its subsequent spread are typically explained
as constituting the establishment of public control over use of private property that was
made necessary by the increasing complexity, congestion, and density of modern urban
life”); RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 134, § 1:1.
229. See MICHAEL HOLLERAN, BOSTON’S “CHANGEFUL TIMES” 166–73 (1998)
(providing a detailed history of Boston’s building height restrictions).
230. See RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 134, § 1:1.

95 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2016)

180

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

limiting their locations.231 Residential landowners’ complaints about
nearby taverns and fears of one opening next door surely contributed
to the growing number of restrictions on where taverns could be sited,
as well.232
As urbanization continued into the early twentieth century,
ordinances that targeted certain types of land uses and particular
areas of town eventually became insufficient to adequately address
growing tensions among neighboring urban land uses in some cities.233
At that historic breaking point, zoning ordinances began to quickly
spread across the nation.234 Municipalities throughout the country
increasingly adopted zoning laws to help preserve the precious
tranquility of residential neighborhoods in modern times.235 To quote
Justice Sutherland’s words in the famous 1926 zoning case, Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.:236
Building zone laws are of modern origin . . . . Until recent
years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great
increase and concentration of population, problems have
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and
will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the
use and occupation of private lands in urban communities.
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which . . . are
so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century
ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been
rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are
sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons
analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which,
before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street
railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and
unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while
the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope
of their application must expand or contract to meet the new
and different conditions . . . .237
An analogous situation arguably exists today, as drone
technologies increasingly engender conflicts that ordinary trespass or

231. See id.
232. See id. (providing historical background on the tensions and problems that
sparked local ordinances and restrictions in the early twentieth century).
233. See id. § 1:2.
234. See id. § 1:1.
235. See id. § 1:2 (detailing the “city beautiful” movement, which sought to preserve the
tranquility and attractiveness of residential areas).
236. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
237. Id. at 386–87.
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nuisance claims and broad federal regulations are ill-equipped to
govern. Even state aerial trespass laws or other airspace rights
statutes can only offer limited privacy protection for landowners in
many settings.238 Particularly in urban areas where parcel sizes tend to
be relatively small, a drone hovering 100 feet above an adjacent
parcel can get nearly as much visual access into a secluded yard next
door as a drone that flies directly above the secluded area. Nuisance
claims do not require any sort of physical intrusion into the space of
another and thus might theoretically provide a basis for liability in
some situations.239 However, just as nuisance law and other general
state law provisions ultimately proved inadequate on their own to
govern land use conflicts in the early twentieth century, such laws will
ultimately prove insufficient to govern drone use conflicts among
neighbors.
Early twentieth century policymakers turned to municipal zoning
to more effectively manage the growing volume of land use conflicts
arising in that period, and drone zoning could serve a similar function
as drones increasingly compete for the use of low-altitude airspace in
the coming years. Already, several cities have crafted ordinances
aimed at protecting the serenity of residential neighborhoods from
powerful drone technologies.240 The city of Evanston, Illinois,
imposed a two-year moratorium on drones in 2013.241 In the same
year, Iowa City, Iowa, adopted an ordinance by popular petition that
prohibited the use of drones for the enforcement of qualified traffic
law violations.242 A few months later, the small town of St.
238. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
239. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (defining
private nuisance as a “nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land”).
240. See, e.g., PARADISE VALLEY, ARIZ., MUN. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -4 (2015), http://www
.ci.paradise-valley.az.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/101
[https://perma.cc/UD3X-7HV4]
(discussing prohibitions against flying drones above others’ land without express
permission and against flying drones above public property without a special permit, and
listing requirements for city-level registration of commercial drones).
241. See Ciara McCarthy, Evanston City Council Passes Moratorium on Drones,
Debates Zoning Ordinance, DAILY NORTHWESTERN (May 28, 2013), http://
dailynorthwestern.com/2013/05/28/city/evanston-council-passes-moratorium-on-drones
-debates-zoning-ordinance/ [https://perma.cc/L7S8-SJRK] (describing the ordinance as
“an important symbol of Evanston’s commitment to protecting the privacy and safety of
its residents”).
242. IOWA CITY, IOWA, CITY CODE § 9-11-1 to -2 (2016), http://www.sterlingcodifiers
.com/codebook/index.php?book_id=953 [https://perma.cc/9KMW-Z63W]; see also Adam
B. Sullivan, Iowa City’s Drone Ban May Be First of Its Kind in the U.S., PRESSCITIZEN.COM (June 5, 2013), http://www.iowadot.gov/aviation/news/pdfs/Iowa%20City's
%20drone%20ban%20may%20be%20first%20of%20its%20kind%20in%20the%20U.S.
%20_%20Iowa%20City%20Press.pdf [https://perma.cc/L26N-UZUZ].
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Bonafacius, Minnesota, enacted an indefinite ban on civilian
drones.243 More recently, the Board of Commissioners of Long Beach
Township, New Jersey, adopted an ordinance providing that
unauthorized operators of drones within township limits could face up
to ninety days of jail time or fines of up to $2,000.244 Multiple other
local governments have also recently adopted or considered drone
use restrictions, and additional ordinances are sure to come.245 Much
like the early twentieth century location restrictions on
slaughterhouses and taverns that served as precursors to modern
zoning, many of these proposed or adopted ordinances only restrict
drone flying in certain localized areas such as residential
neighborhoods.246
243. ST. BONIFACIUS, MINN., CITY CODE §§ 9-9.1 to -9.6 (2013), http://www.ci.stbonifacius.mn.us/drones.pdf [https://perma.cc/D65J-4KSH]; see also Tom Meersman, St.
Bonifacius Says No to Drones, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 6, 2013, 12:07 AM), http://www
.startribune.com/st-bonifacius-says-no-to-drones/201723501/ [https://perma.cc/PU6H-JVWF].
244. TOWNSHIP OF LONG BEACH, N.J., CODE §§ 1-17, 57-2 to -4 (2015), http://
ecode360.com/30512985 [https://perma.cc/NTM4-FZ5E]; see also Erik Larsen, Long Beach
Township Bans Drones, ASBURY PARK PRESS (May 26, 2015, 11:12 AM), http://www.app
.com/story/news/local/ocean-county/2015/05/22/long-beach-township-bans-drones/27817439/
[https://perma.cc/E8PD-DJJN].
245. See, e.g., PARADISE VALLEY, ARIZ., MUN. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -4 (2015), http://www
.ci.paradise-valley.az.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/101 [https://perma.cc/UD3X-7HV4]
(detailing prohibitions against drone flying above others’ land without express permission
and against drone flying above public property without a special permit, and listing
requirements for city-level registration of commercial drones); see also John Best, Forks
Township Supervisors Discuss Possibility of Drone Laws, LEHIGHVALLEYLIVE (June 8,
2015, 12:52 PM), http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/easton/index.ssf/2015/06/forks_township
_supervisors_dis.html [https://perma.cc/2RUW-3LNX]; Molly Eadie, Public Safety
Committee Tables Ordinance Regulating Drone Use, TROY REC. POL. (Feb. 19, 2015, 9:34
PM), http://www.troyrecord.com/government-and-politics/20150219/public-safety-committeetables-ordinance-regulating-drone-use [https://perma.cc/M4KH-2SND] (describing possible
changes to a proposed ordinance in Troy, New York, that would allow for either a $250
fine or fifteen days of jail time for the unauthorized use of drones in the city); Lake
Havasu Officials Mull Regulating Use of Drones, WASH. TIMES (May 30, 2015), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/30/lake-havasu-officials-mull-regulating-use-of-drone/
[https://perma.cc/84DC-TMBB] (stating that city council officials in Lake Havasu City,
Nevada, were considering an ordinance that would prohibit flying drones below 600 feet in
local airspace); Steve Myric, No Fly Zone for Drones on Land Bank Properties,
VINEYARD GAZETTE (Dec. 28, 2015, 4:59 PM), http://vineyardgazette.com/news/2015/12/28
/no-fly-zone-drones-land-bank-properties?k=vg5682b565e7863&r=1 [https://perma.cc/R6XT
-Q44P] (describing a new ban on drone flying over 3,100 acres of conservation lands on
Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts); Jourdan Vian, Bangor Finishes Ordinance Revamp;
Hearing in August, COULEE NEWS (May 28, 2015), http://lacrossetribune.com/couleenews
/news/local/bangor-finishes-ordinance-revamp-hearing-in-august/article_71b941ce-5449-5df0aa59-0a1a9ccafcc0.html [https://perma.cc/R4GX-VER6] (reporting that officials in the
Village of Bangor, Wisconsin, drafted ordinances that would ban flying drones within the
village without a permit).
246. See, e.g., Blake Herzog, California City to Vote on Banning Drones, USA TODAY
(Apr. 4, 2013, 9:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/04/rancho-
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In other countries, drone restrictions are similarly growing more
location-specific. For example, the Japanese government enacted a
law in 2016 prohibiting unauthorized civilian drone flights over
government buildings and certain other areas.247 The United Arab
Emirates has enacted similar rules.248 These location-based
restrictions likewise resemble the early land use ordinances that
served as precursors to modern zoning laws in the early twentieth
century.249
Given these historical similarities, it is not surprising that at least
a couple of commentators have already begun to imagine the
possibilities of using horizontal zoning ordinances to help regulate
civilian drone use.250 The legal rules applicable to drone uses under
these ordinances would vary depending on the specific “zone” of land
over which the drone would fly. Such drone zoning laws could utilize
existing land use zoning maps, basing drone use rules on whether a
drone is flying above a residential, commercial, industrial, or other
mirage-hobby-drones-ban/2052193/ [https://perma.cc/G3SH-N823] (reporting that the city
of Rancho Mirage, California, contemplated adopting an ordinance that would have
prohibited drone flying below 400 feet in all “areas zoned residential” within the city);
Michael Riconda, County Legislature Approves Restrictions on Drone Use, ROCKLAND
CTY. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.rocklandtimes.com/2015/06/17/county-legislatureapproves-restrictions-on-drone-use/ [https://perma.cc/73CV-8HPN] (describing a newly
adopted ordinance in Rockland County, New York, that prohibits drone flying above
“governmental buildings such as the Rockland County Jail and Sheriff’s complex, houses
of worship, courts or sewer facilities”).
247. See Japan's Safety Rules on Unmanned Aircraft (UA), CIV. AVIATION BUREAU,
http://www.mlit.go.jp/en/koku/uas.html [https://perma.cc/RMR8-E7RK]; Miriam McNabb,
Japan Passes Strict Drone Laws Ahead of G7 Summit, DRONELIFE.COM (Mar. 17, 2016),
http://dronelife.com/2016/03/17/japan-passes-strict-drone-laws-ahead-of-g7-summit/ [https://
perma.cc/2R5N-MZ56].
248. See Gen. Civil Aviation Auth., Civil Aviation Regulation pt. 8, sub-pt. 10, §§ 3.7–
3.9 (2015) (U.A.E.), https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/epublication/pages/cars.aspx [https://perma
.cc/LN6G-748J] (stating the limitations on drone use in controlled and segregated
airspace); see also Mohammed El Sadafy, Drones with Cameras in Residential Areas
Punishable, EMIRATES 24/7 (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates
/drones-with-cameras-in-residential-areas-punishable-2015-02-15-1.580800 [https://perma.cc
/L3VQ-X2ES] (quoting a police official in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, as stating that
“[f]lying drones fitted with cameras in residential areas is a punishable offence as per the
Federal Criminal Code”).
249. See supra Section III.C.3.
250. See, e.g., Robert A. Heverly, The State of Drones: State Authority to Regulate
Drones, 8 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 29, 61 (2015) (arguing that “devising appropriate zoning
rules is one step that states and localities can take now to ensure appropriate integration
of drones into the local community”); Jordan Ferguson, Drone on Drones: Drone Zones,
BBKNOWLEDGE.COM (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.bbknowledge.com/public-safety/drone-ondrones-drone-zones/ [https://perma.cc/LK5T-WEVK] (suggesting that “[f]or now, zoning
for drones is premature—yet we may soon see a time where localities are forced to think
about how to accommodate more crowded skies”).
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land use zone. Alternatively, municipalities could create overlay
zoning maps that sit atop land use zoning maps and apply solely to
drone flying activity.251 Because drone activities could increasingly
impact land use permitting decisions and comprehensive land use
planning, municipalities could benefit from having the ability to craft
drone zoning laws for their own jurisdictions.252
IV. DESIGNING AN EFFICIENT DRONE ZONING LAW
Where should cities begin in their attempts to craft drone zoning
ordinances? Unfortunately, municipal officials tasked with creating
these ordinances are likely to soon discover that they have few
templates or examples from which to commence the drafting process.
The sort of horizontal drone zoning ordinance contemplated in this
Article is largely unprecedented, and few policymakers or scholars
have written about such an approach.253
Because drone zoning is a strategy borne out of conventional
land use zoning policies, the existing body of land use zoning laws is a
valuable starting point for designing any drone zoning ordinance.
Land use zoning seeks to keep loud factories away from doctors’
offices and to prevent nightclubs from popping up in residential
neighborhoods. Rather than waiting to address conflicts after they
arise, conventional zoning ordinances regulate land uses ex ante and
thereby prevent many conflicts from ever occurring.254 Of course, land
use zoning is not without its critics—it can contribute to
socioeconomic and racial segregation, isolation, sprawl, and other
problems.255 However, the widespread adoption of zoning laws
251. For more in-depth information on the practice of overlay zoning, see Patricia E.
Salkin, Zoning and Land Use Planning: Effective Disaster Mitigation Depends upon WellCoordinated Local Land Use Planning and Zoning, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 108, 116–18 (2005)
(providing more information about overlay zoning and describing it as “a flexible zoning
technique that enables a municipality to essentially layer an additional set of regulations
on top of existing requirements in a particular zoning district” and providing details on
potential uses of overlay zoning ordinances).
252. For more details on the role of comprehensive plans in local zoning policy, see
generally FISCHEL, supra note 191, at 31.
253. Few have referenced drone zoning in this way. To review these limited references,
as of early 2016, see generally Rule, supra note 143 and Atherton, supra note 209.
254. See Stephen J. Eagle, Kelo, Directed Growth, and Municipal Industrial Policy, 17
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 63, 70–71 (2009) (“The common law dealt with . . . negative
externality problem[s] through private and public nuisance law. To deal with the problem
ex ante rather than ex post, localities imposed comprehensive zoning regulations almost a
century ago.”).
255. See, e.g., Garrett Power, The Unwisdom of Allowing City Growth to Work out Its
Own Destiny, 47 MD. L. REV. 626, 668–69 (1988) (summarizing briefly many of the
common criticisms of land use zoning).
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throughout the country and the continued use of such laws are
evidence of their great value to modern society. Several elements of
this established body of law could eventually prove useful in the
drone zoning context as well.
To be clear, the vision of drone zoning described in this Article is
substantially different from the supposed drone “zoning” model that
Amazon Prime Air unveiled in July 2015.256 Amazon’s vision of drone
zoning necessarily assumed broad federal power, enabling the
company to freely fly drones over the vast majority of the nation’s
land, regardless of the wishes of landowners or of state or local
authorities. Under Amazon’s proposal, the FAA would divide nearly
all of the nation’s low-altitude airspace vertically rather than
horizontally.257 Specifically, the agency would designate space
between 400 and 500 feet above the ground as a drone no-fly zone,
reserve space between 200 and 400 feet for “high-speed transit” of
drones, and leave space below 200 feet for “low-speed, localized
transit.”258 Amazon’s plan provided for no horizontal zoning of drone
uses except to designate certain predefined low-risk areas where
hobbyist drones with fewer safety features could freely fly.259
In contrast, the drone zoning policies envisioned in this Article
would allow drone use rules to vary from neighborhood to
neighborhood, much as land use restrictions in commercially zoned or
industrially zoned areas differ from those in single family residential
areas. For the reasons described above, such variation and tailoring of
drone use restrictions by location could promote more optimal uses of
the nation’s scarce low-altitude airspace as drone activity increases in
the United States.260 Drone zoning ordinances could eventually
become a key means of accommodating valuable drone uses in a city
without unduly sacrificing other important uses of the airspace
involved. The following subsections describe how the same simple
economics principles that help to shape land use zoning ordinances
could eventually serve a similar function in the development of
municipal drone zoning laws.
256. See Elizabeth Weise, Amazon Proposes Dividing Air into Drone Zones, USA
TODAY (July 29, 2015, 11:57 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/07/28/amazon
-drone-zone/30798777/ [https://perma.cc/K6BC-2925] (describing a policy proposal by
Amazon Prime Air Vice President Gur Kimchi that would divide Class G airspace—space
less than 500 feet above the ground—into three layers to segregate drone uses by type and
to provide a buffer between drones and conventional air traffic).
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. See id.
260. See supra Section III.C.
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A. Weighing Costs and Benefits
Basic microeconomic theory provides a useful general
framework for designating drone zones and crafting drone restrictions
applicable to each type of zone. In essence, drone use should be
legally permissible only when and where its net social benefits are
greater than zero. In other words, if the aggregate benefits to society
of allowing a particular type of drone to fly in a particular location
and at a particular time exceed the aggregate social costs of that
drone flight, then the activity should be allowable under the law.261 If
not, then laws should generally prohibit the drone activity.
Concededly, recitations of this sort of simple cost-benefit
analysis, in the abstract, almost always obscure the complexity and
challenges of actually making the calculations. For example, if a
pizzeria charges a five-dollar fee to deliver a pizza from its restaurant
to a home three miles away, what is the net social benefit of that
activity?262 A naïve answer might be that the flight generated five
dollars in value, since that is what the pizza customer paid for it.
However, the actual net benefit could be significantly greater or less
than five dollars. Among other things, the use of a drone rather than
an automobile to deliver the pizza would likely reduce the total
carbon dioxide emissions or other harmful environmental impacts
involved.263 Drone-assisted deliveries might also help reduce traffic
congestion and pose comparatively fewer risks to pedestrians and on-

261. For a more thorough examination of this concept, see supra Section IV.B.
262. Some pizza companies in and out of the United States have already hinted to
consumers that they intend to offer drone-assisted pizza delivery in the future. See, e.g.,
Rebecca Borison, This Russian Pizzeria Will Deliver Your Pizza by Drone, BUS. INSIDER
(June 23, 2014, 4:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/russian-pizzeria-delivers-pizzaby-drone-2014-6 [https://perma.cc/HK7Z-ELZG] (reporting that DoDo Pizza, a restaurant
in Syktyvkar, Russia, is using drones to deliver pizzas to customers); Sarah Dougherty,
India Delivers First Pizza by Drone, Kind Of . . . , NBC NEWS (May 29, 2014, 12:01 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/india-delivers-first-pizza-drone-kind-n117611 [https://
perma.cc/MLF4-VW3E] (describing how, in India, Francesco’s Pizza reduced its pizza
delivery time from thirty minutes to ten minutes by delivering the pizza with a drone);
Frank Rosario, Pizzeria Owner Uses Drone to Deliver Pie in Test Flight, N.Y. POST (Nov.
7, 2014, 3:25 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/11/07/pizzeria-owner-uses-drone-to-deliver-piein-test-flight/ [https://perma.cc/8YT2-5EHU] (describing a pizzeria owner in Brooklyn,
New York, who predicts that his company will “have a fleet of at least 25 drones to deliver
pizza” by the year 2018).
263. See generally Climate Change: The Social Cost of Carbon, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/scc.html [https://
perma.cc/4FTJ-9D6X] (last updated Aug. 9, 2016) (providing the Environmental Protection
Agency’s estimation of the social costs of carbon dioxide emissions).

95 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2016)

2016]

DRONE REGULATION

187

road vehicles.264 On the other hand, the delivery drone’s buzz and
presence overhead might disturb land use activities below or create
additional safety or privacy risks. In practice, it would be impossible
to accurately measure all such costs and benefits for every
conceivable drone flight and fully account for them in a set of local
drone restrictions. And even if that were possible, the calculation
would still be incomplete; officials would need to factor all of the
costs of creating, implementing, and enforcing drone use restrictions
into the calculation as well.
Fortunately, despite imperfect information and other limitations,
a wide range of valuable land use regulatory activities still occur every
day in municipalities throughout the country, and cost-benefit
analysis is often implicit in those policy decisions.265 Local drone use
regulations would be no different in that regard, and at least
attempting to identify and consider costs and benefits is a vital
exercise when forming local drone zoning policies.
B.

Incorporating the Dimension of Time

One promising way to improve the precision and efficiency of
local drone use regulation is to craft drone use rules that vary based
on the time of day, the day of the week, the month, or the year. There
seem to be greater possibilities for varying restrictions based on this
“fourth dimension” of time in the context of drone law than there has
ever been in the realm of land use regulation.266 Flying a drone is a far
more temporary activity than most of the land development matters
that municipalities restrict under ordinary zoning ordinances.267
264. See Mark Delucchi, The Social Cost of Motor Vehicle Use, ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 1997, at 130, 131–33, 135, 138–39 (1997) (describing research that
uses factors such as injuries from accidents and traffic congestion to measure the social
costs of automobile travel); Benjamin J. Wickizer & Andrew Snow, Rediscovering the
Transportation Frontier: Improving Sustainability in the United States Through Passenger
Rail, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2010, at 12, 12 (“Reliance on automobile use
exacts a social cost in the form of compromised environmental, health, and quality of life
factors.”).
265. See, e.g., David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1681–91 (2013)
(describing the ongoing economics-oriented debate over zoning and highlighting how
economics principles influence land use planning). See generally Robert C. Ellickson,
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U.
CHI. L. REV. 681, 687–99 (1973) (advocating for the use of cost-benefit analysis in the land
use regulatory context).
266. For a detailed discussion of the integral nature of time in law, see generally
Rebecca R. French, Time in the Law, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 663 (2001).
267. Compare Cara McGoogan, These Hydrogen-Powered Drones Can Fly for Hours,
WIRED UK (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2015-12/15/droneshydrogen-fuel-cells-intelligent-energy [https://perma.cc/F522-EX4B] (highlighting the
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Constructing a building on land involves a sizable financial
investment, tends to occur infrequently on any given parcel, and often
has decades-long impacts.268 In contrast, civilian drone flights and
their effects on land uses tend to be short-lived and can recur multiple
times in a day.269
The specific timing and context of drone activity can also greatly
impact the nature and extent of its impacts on nearby land uses.270 For
example, in residential communities where preserving the privacy of
backyard patios and swimming pools is paramount, drone flights on
weekend afternoons during the summer months might be far more
disruptive than identical flights over the same areas on weekday
mornings during winter months.271 Accordingly, policymakers are
already beginning to tailor drone restrictions to specify not only
where citizens may operate drones, but also when they may operate
them.272
A simple graphical analysis comparable to the one Professor
William Fischel has used in the air pollution context helps to illustrate
the potential efficiency advantages of incorporating the dimension of
time into drone use restrictions.273 Figure A below depicts the costs
and benefits of drone activity in a hypothetical residential

temporary nature of the use of drones), with Mark Magnier, Japan’s Houses of Horror,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at A1 (emphasizing the durability of United States’ buildings by
stating that a United States home has an average life of forty-four years).
268. See Magnier, supra note 267, atA4 (comparing the average life of a Japanese
house, which is twenty-six years, to that of a United States house, which is forty-four
years).
269. See McGoogan, supra note 267 (reporting that the “typical” flight time limit for
small drones is about twenty minutes, but that newer prototypes using solar and hydrogen
technologies have remained airborne for several hours).
270. See Margot E. Kaminski, Enough with the “Sunbathing Teenager” Gambit, SLATE
(May 17, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/05
/drone_privacy_is_about_much_more_than_sunbathing_teenage_daughters.html [https://
perma.cc/848N-BJAJ] (articulating many circumstances in which drone use impacts
people, from peeping into backyards to thermal imaging a person’s facial expressions).
271. See id. (conceding that examples of drones peeping down onto private swimmers
and sunbathers are concrete and relatable, implying a real and heightened privacy
concern, but emphasizing that these are not the only privacy concerns related to drone
use).
272. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., Cities Hosting the Papal Visit Are
No Drone Zones (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm
?newsId=19474 [https://perma.cc/V3AT-7CW8] (demonstrating an example of a timebased restriction and explaining that Washington, D.C.; New York, New York; and
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were FAA-designated no drone zones from September 22 to
September 27, 2015).
273. See FISCHEL, supra note 191, at 82–93.
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neighborhood.274 The curve labeled MC in Figure A represents the
marginal cost to society from each additional hour per year of lowaltitude drone activity occurring in the area.275 Most of the costs
reflected in this sort of curve are likely to relate to drones’ potential
to interfere with residents’ safety, privacy, and quiet enjoyment of
their land. The curve’s shape, initially sloping downward and then
gradually sloping upward, is based on assumptions that the first few
hours of permitted drone activity per year tend to be particularly
disruptive of landowner privacy and that the severity of disruption
beyond that initial quantity of flying varies depending on the time of
day or year.276

274. See, e.g., id. (using an analytical approach—which is analogous to that of this
Section—to conduct a similar analysis for determining the optimal amount of permissible
air pollution from a mill based on the benefits to the mill and costs to the community).
275. This analysis assumes that the social marginal cost of a drone flight includes all
costs to the individual operating the drone (private marginal cost) and all costs to all
others in society that are attributable to that drone flight. It makes similar assumptions
regarding the social marginal benefits of drone flying. For a more detailed explanation of
the concept of social marginal cost and how it differs from private marginal cost, see
generally KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 381–83 (1989). For
simplicity, the analysis also holds all other variables constant, including the types of
involved drones, the nature of their flight activity, and the population density and land
uses below drone flights.
276. While such assumptions would not conform to reality in all locations, they are
seemingly plausible as a hypothetical matter and are made to facilitate full illustration of
this mode of analysis.
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Figure A: Social Marginal Costs and Benefits of Drone Use in a
Hypothetical Residential Neighborhood

In contrast, the curve labeled MB in Figure A represents the
hypothetical marginal benefits to society from each additional hour
per year of drone flying in this hypothetical neighborhood. Such
benefits might include the enjoyment that hobbyists and spectators
derive from operating or watching small drones within the
community. They might also include the time and resource savings
achievable through drone-assisted delivery services, or the value of
being able to capture drone-assisted aerial photos or video footage
without the greater expense and safety risks associated with using
manned aircraft. The benefits associated with countless other
potential drone uses, ranging from agricultural applications277 to data
gathering,278 would be encompassed in this curve as well. The curve’s
slight downward slope reflects an assumption of diminishing marginal

277. See generally Todd J. Janzen & Thomas P. Redick, Drone Use in Agriculture at
Home and Abroad—U.S. Law Still “Up in the Air”, 19 A.B.A AGRIC. MGMT. COMM.
NEWSL., Sept. 2014, at 6, 6–7 (showing an introductory primer on the potential use of
drone technologies in agriculture and some of the unresolved legal issues associated with
drones).
278. See, e.g., Emma Marris, Fly, and Bring Me Data, NATURE, June 2013, at 156, 156–
58 (2013) (showing the potential applications of drone technologies by describing how
drones are assisting with data gathering for scientific research).
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returns from each additional hour of drone activity in the
community.279
The point labeled Q*, situated at the intersection of the MC and
MB curves in Figure A, represents the optimal quantity of drone
activity in this hypothetical neighborhood. The location of Q* near
the middle of the graph’s x-axis suggests that drone activity in this
hypothetical neighborhood would generate positive net social benefits
much of the time. An optimal set of rules for this neighborhood
would produce exactly Q* hours per year of drone use.280
Unfortunately, much of today’s drone use regulation fails to
consider the element of time and is thus highly prone to
inefficiency.281 The shaded areas in Figure A illustrate the potential
social welfare losses associated with these sorts of imprecise drone
restrictions. The shaded triangular area to the left of Q* in Figure A
represents the deadweight loss that would result under a law flatly
prohibiting any and all drone activity in this hypothetical
neighborhood.282 Such a restriction would create this deadweight loss
because it would preclude Q* hours of cost-justified drone flying per
year—drone activity that would have otherwise generated societal
benefits in excess of its costs. Ordinances recently adopted in some
cities that sweepingly prohibit all civilian drone activity within their
boundaries generate these sorts of efficiency losses.283
Conversely, the lighter shaded triangular area situated to the
right of Q* represents the potential deadweight loss under an
excessively permissive rule that allows drone activity within this
hypothetical neighborhood all day every day. Such a rule would
permit hours of drone activities in excess of Q*, which would impose
costs on society that would outweigh the commensurate benefits. If
the FAA granted broad drone use authorizations to companies such
as Amazon and Alphabet under a “ceiling preemption” rule that

279. See, e.g., CASE & FAIR, supra note 275, at 140, 170–71 (describing diminishing
marginal returns, diminishing marginal utility, and diminishing marginal productivity).
280. See id. at 196–97 (explaining the general principle that the optimal quantity of an
activity is the quantity at which the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost).
281. See, e.g., FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 333,
126 Stat. 75, 75–76 (2012) (lacking temporal restrictions on drone regulations).
282. See, e.g., PARADISE VALLEY, ARIZ., MUN. CODE § 10-12 (2015), http://www.ci.paradise
-valley.az.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/101 [https://perma.cc/UD3X-7HV4] (demonstrating
an example of a city that has adopted a flat prohibition of drone use in neighborhoods).
283. See id.
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would preempt state and local restrictions, it would generate this
troubling class of social welfare losses.284
Temporal drone use restrictions have the potential to reduce the
sorts of efficiency losses represented in the two shaded areas in Figure
A. An ordinance allowing drone uses only on certain days of the
week or times of day within a neighborhood could do far better than
either a flat prohibition or a broad authorization of drone use at
promoting a quantity of drone activity that approximates Q*. For
instance, local officials might opt to allow drone activity within a
neighborhood only on weekdays from 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and 2:00
p.m. to 4:00 p.m., if it determined that drone flying during these
limited hours seemed to generate the greatest net benefits based on
officials’ estimates of the value of drone delivery services and other
drone uses in the area, landowners’ privacy interests, and other
relevant factors. As technology advances, municipalities might
someday even be able to charge fees for drone uses that vary based
on the drone’s location and the time of day. Some governments
already use similar temporal fee systems to help regulate traffic on
congested roadways.285
C.

Designating Drone Zones

The greatest potential advantage of drone zoning ordinances
over general drone regulations is the ability to tailor drone use rules
to fit specific neighborhoods across a city. The graph in Figure A
shows only the costs and benefits of drone activity associated with a
single hypothetical neighborhood. Other neighborhoods within a city
are likely to have quite different cost-benefit profiles. Drone zoning
can help governments craft restrictions that account for such
differences in the same way that land use zoning has served that
function for nearly a century.286 The following extended hypothetical
helps to demonstrate the potential usefulness of drone zoning and
highlights some additional principles for designating drone zones.
Suppose that, after receiving multiple citizen complaints about
civilian drones flying within certain neighborhoods, officials in
Hoverville, a second hypothetical city in the United States, began
284. See supra notes 119–27 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed
description of “ceiling preemption” and its potential impacts).
285. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency Versus Public Choice: The Case of
Property Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. L. REV. 673, 723–25 (2008)
(describing temporal congestion pricing schemes applicable on certain roadways in New
Jersey and elsewhere).
286. See supra Section III.C.3.
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considering ordinances aimed at addressing the problem. Intrigued by
the potential economic development opportunities available through
drone technologies, officials did not want to impose a blanket
moratorium or prohibition on drone use within the city. Therefore,
they opted to instead treat civilian drone activity as something akin to
a land use and tackle the issue through a drone zoning ordinance.
Figure B: Portions of Hoverville’s Hypothetical Zoning Map

Using the best information available to them, Hoverville city
officials prepared the simple drone overlay zoning map shown in
Figure B above. The map shows the new “drone zoning” designations
the officials made for each area, labeled as D-1, D-2, and D-3. These
new designations supplemented rather than displaced the residential,
commercial, industrial, and other land use zoning designations on the
city’s existing zoning map.
1. No Drone Zones
Drone zoning ordinances could enable cities to severely restrict
drone uses in neighborhoods that are poorly suited for widespread
drone activity. Suppose, for example, that most of the drone-related
complaints that prompted Hoverville city officials to craft the city’s
drone ordinance involved certain residential areas near a public park
and golf course on the western side of town. In these neighborhoods,
which were filled with single-family homes and backyard swimming
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pools, most residents opposed any flying of drones except in
emergency situations. The overriding concern in these residential
communities was the threat of drones interfering with privacy and
tranquility.
Figure C: Social Marginal Costs and Benefits of Drone Use in a
Hypothetical “No Drone Zone”

The graph in Figure C above employs the basic graphical
approach and background assumptions used in Figure A to depict the
hypothetical costs and benefits of drone flying in these types of
privacy-sensitive neighborhoods. The optimal quantity of drone
activity shown in this new graph—labeled Q1*—is significantly lower
than the Q* equilibrium quantity shown in Figure A. Only drone
activity up to a quantity of Q1* hours per year within these
communities would generate social benefits sufficient to outweigh the
accompanying social costs.
Recognizing that only a negligible amount of drone activity in
these sorts of neighborhoods was cost-justifiable, Hoverville’s city
council opted to designate them as “D-1” or “no drone zones,”
generally prohibiting drone activity.287 However, the city also knew
that Q1* was greater than zero; therefore, officials recognized some

287. See PARADISE VALLEY, ARIZ., MUN. CODE § 10-12 (2015), http://www.ci.paradisevalley.az.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/101 [https://perma.cc/UD3X-7HV4] (showing an
example of a city that has already enacted an ordinance effectively designating its entire
jurisdiction as a no drone zone).
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narrow circumstances under which the benefits of drone flying in
these areas exceeded the costs. For instance, residents might
occasionally wish to capture drone-assisted aerial video footage of a
backyard wedding on their land or to take aerial photos of a home
they were listing for sale.288 To accommodate this narrow set of
justifiable drone uses, the city could add provisions to its drone
ordinance that would allow citizens to seek temporary use permits for
drone activities at certain requested places and times within D-1
zones.289 That permit process could require applicants to provide
written notice to all landowners within a specified radius of the flight
area, making neighbors aware of the proposed drone use and
providing an opportunity for them to reasonably object. The
ordinance provisions relating to these D-1 zones could likewise
provide clear exceptions for occasional drone uses by law
enforcement agencies and emergency responders under specified
conditions.
2. Limited Drone Use Zones
Of course, drone zoning can enable cities to establish and
enforce less restrictive drone use rules in neighborhoods where drone
activity is somewhat more cost-justifiable. For simplicity, this diverse
set of neighborhoods better suited for somewhat less restrictive rules
is collectively classified in this Article as “D-2” or “limited drone use”
zones. The commercially zoned areas and the multi-family/mixed use
neighborhood shown in Figure B are potentially good candidates for
the D-2 drone zoning designation. The social costs and benefits of
drone activity in these sorts of areas are generally comparable to
those graphically depicted in Figure A above, which shows Q*—some
moderate amount—as the optimal quantity of drone use.290
There are countless reasons why this D-2 class of neighborhoods
might benefit from a greater amount of drone activity than is
permitted in D-1 zones. On the cost side of the equation, if fewer
residents within an area have private backyards or swimming pools,
drone flights there might pose a comparatively smaller threat to
landowner privacy. On the benefits side, severe traffic congestion, a

288. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text (referencing these types of drone
uses, which landowners tend to demand only occasionally on any given parcel).
289. Temporary use permits are a common and often valuable tool for incorporating
flexibility into land use and zoning policies. See David S. Silverman, The Temporary Use
and Economic Development, 66 PLAN. & ENVTL. L., July 2014, at 8, 8 (providing an
informative discussion of temporary use permits).
290. See supra notes 273–80 and accompanying text.
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dearth of nearby brick-and-mortar shopping, or parking limits that
make shopping more difficult in an area might make drone-assisted
delivery services comparatively more appealing.
As stated above, neighborhoods in this middle ground may be
best served through ordinances that only allow drone activities during
certain specified hours and days.291 Ordinance provisions for these
zones that limit drone use might also distinguish between commercial
or recreational drone uses. For example, an ordinance might allow
registered commercial drones to operate on weekdays during certain
business hours, yet limit recreational drone activity to a narrower set
of places and times.
3. Open Drone Zones
Those areas of a city or county that are ideally suited for a high
volume of drone activity may warrant an even less restrictive
regulatory approach than is available under a drone zoning
designation like D-2. The neighborhoods designated as “D-3,” or
“open drone use” zone areas on the hypothetical map in Figure B,
represent this third general category of zones. Many industrially
zoned neighborhoods, which have few residents and instead house
warehouses, factories, rail yards, and the like, might fit into this
category. Even the downtown areas of some major cities may benefit
from relatively relaxed drone restrictions. Such areas tend to be
densely developed, with window-covered, high-rise buildings
towering above both sides of the street. Since there are fewer
backyards or outdoor living spaces in these areas, drone activity might
pose less of a threat to landowner privacy than in single-family
residential communities. And severe traffic congestion problems in
some downtown cores could make drone delivery service there
particularly valuable.292
The hypothetical marginal costs and benefits associated with
drone flying within these open drone use zoning areas are graphically
depicted in Figure D below. As the location of the Q3* equilibrium
point on the right side of the graph suggests, the social benefits of
drone activity within these areas exceeds its potential social costs
291. See supra Section IV.B.
292. Many major downtown cores throughout the world are notorious for having
severe congestion challenges. See, e.g., Josh Cohen, Dublin City Council Poised to Ban
Cars in City Center, NEXT CITY (June 12, 2015), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/dublin-bancars-city-center-city-council-vote [https://perma.cc/JX64-NYHG] (reporting that “congestion
is a major problem in Dublin” and that congestion problems are “nearly standard in
modern cities”).
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most of the time. Accordingly, an optimal set of drone use rules in
these sorts of zones would broadly sanction drone activity during
daylight hours.
Figure D: Social Marginal Costs and Benefits of Drone Use in a
Hypothetical “Open Drone Zone”

Even though drone use would be liberally allowed in D-3 zones,
municipalities could still craft special provisions to restrict drone
activity on specified occasions. For instance, the downtown cores of
many major cities serve as the sites of outdoor festivals, parades, and
marathons, and they often feature concert halls and open-air
professional sports stadiums that regularly draw crowds. Drone
activity might be especially hazardous to safety in downtown areas
during these sorts of events. The steep upward slope of the marginal
cost curve on the right side of the graph in Figure D reflects these
heightened costs. Like traffic signs near elementary schools that
require motorists to observe lower speed limits during school hours,
rules that prohibit or severely limit drone activity during such major
events could easily address these sorts of issues.
A few government entities have already begun imposing special
temporary drone restrictions during public events when they
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anticipate temporary spikes in the social costs of drone use.293 For
example, the Augusta-Richmond County Commission in Georgia
adopted an ordinance prohibiting the use of drones within the county
from April 2 to April 13, 2015—roughly the same time as the
Professional
Golfers
Association’s
prestigious
Masters
Tournament.294 Such approaches can help to preserve public safety
and security during major events without precluding valuable drone
activities during other periods.
4. The Sky Is the Limit
The simple drone zoning concepts outlined in Part IV barely
scratch the surface of what could eventually develop into a robust and
sophisticated area of local government law. Countless other
possibilities for drone zoning remain unexplored. Cities could
someday engage in more detailed three-dimensional drone zoning—
zoning that delineates different sets of rules based on whether a drone
is hovering 50, 150, or 300 feet above the ground. Cities could likewise
vary drone speed limits by altitude and zone, provide for seasonal
variations in drone restrictions across zones, create a far greater
diversity of drone zones, and pursue limitless other strategies.
In addition, rapidly developing geofence systems and related
technologies could substantially reduce municipalities’ costs of
establishing and enforcing the sorts of drone use restrictions
described in this Article.295 Imagine a not-too-distant future day when
cities that have enacted or amended drone zoning ordinances can
simply submit GPS coordinates, time restrictions, and related
information to a centralized geofence system database to create new
geofences reflecting the city’s new ordinance provisions. The city
would then make wireless updates to the software embedded in all
drones registered to operate within the jurisdiction, ensuring that the

293. See, e.g., Susan McCord, Drone Ban in Effect April 2-13, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Mar.
17, 2015), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2015-03-17/drone-ban-effect-april-213# [https://perma.cc/AF63-RRHP] (demonstrating an example of a government entity
imposing temporary drone restrictions during public events); Alex Miceli, Drones Banned
Over Augusta During Masters, GOLFWEEK.COM (March 20, 2015), http://golfweek.com
/news/2015/mar/20/masters-2015-augusta-national-drones-banned/ [https://perma.cc/9EZM
-UGED] (noting that, “[w]ith the Masters being the biggest golf event on the calendar, the
commission understandably wants to protect the event and the largess that it brings to the
community each year”).
294. See Miceli, supra note 293.
295. For more details regarding geofence technologies, see supra notes 149–53 and
accompanying text.
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devices automatically recognize and obey the new ordinance rules.296
As these sorts of technologies continue to mature and become even
more cost-effective, they will only increase the appeal of local drone
zoning ordinances and temporal drone restrictions.
Unfortunately, the ultimate richness of drone policy depends
heavily on the degree to which states and local governments are able
to participate. Basic public choice theory principles suggest that
powerful corporations with highly concentrated benefits at stake, such
as Amazon and Alphabet, could well have the upper hand in battles
over federal preemption of state and local drone laws.297 If these
corporations succeed in persuading Congress and the FAA to largely
block the development of state and municipal drone regulation, most
of the policy innovations described in this Article will never come to
fruition, and imprecise federal drone rules will occupy this regulatory
space.298 There is a reason for optimism that a coordinated federal,
state, and local drone regulatory structure could still ultimately
emerge, however: the FAA’s new Small UAS Rule (Part 107),
effective as of August 2016, did not provide for blanket preemption of
state and local drone laws.299 Hopefully, federal policymakers will
recognize what is at stake and embrace policies that promote the state
and municipal involvement needed to facilitate a more efficient
evolution of drone law.

296. Some drones are already capable of being updated to obey additional geofence
restrictions. For example, DJI released a 2015 update downloadable by Phantom 2 drone
owners that prevented those drones from entering airspace near the White House after a
highly publicized drone incident above that property. See Nick Lavars, DJI Firmware
Update Makes the White House a Drone No-Fly Zone, NEW ATLAS (Feb. 2, 2015), http://
newatlas.com/dji-firmware-drones-white-house/35890/ [https://perma.cc/UMP8-RN2Y].
297. The notion that powerful stakeholders with highly concentrated benefits at stake
tend to more easily secure desired policy outcomes than masses of individuals with highly
diffused costs at stake is foundational in public choice theory. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis,
The Original Constitution and Its Decline: A Public Choice Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 195, 202 (1997) (noting that “[p]ublic choice theory suggests and observations
confirm that political entrepreneurs . . . favor legislative programs with concentrated
benefits and diffuse costs” (citation omitted)); Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of
Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77, 90 (2009) (discussing the “public choice theory” that
“[g]overnment institutions . . . are prone to capture by special interests that have an
incentive to obtain concentrated benefits by imposing diffuse costs on the general public”
(citation omitted)).
298. As of July 2016, a bill had cleared the United States Senate that, if enacted, would
preempt most state and local drone regulation. See Federal Aviation Administration
Reauthorization Act of 2016, S. 2658, 114th Cong. § 2142(a) (2016). For the author’s own
description of the preemption provisions in the bill and their potential impacts, see Troy
A. Rule, Take Cover Against This Drone Attack, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2016, at A13.
299. See supra notes 51, 97–98 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Drone technologies have the potential to enhance productivity
and benefit lives in a diverse array of settings throughout the world.
However, these benefits to society could also be unduly limited if
outmoded or ill-suited regulatory structures get in their way.
Engineers’ exceptional ingenuity and vision has driven rapid
advancements in drone technologies in recent years. Now
policymakers must exhibit an equal degree of inventiveness in their
efforts to build regulatory systems capable of effectively governing
these powerful devices.
Although drones bear many similarities to the airplanes and
manned helicopters that the FAA has long regulated, drones are also
distinct in ways that necessitate a more coordinated federal, state, and
local regulatory framework. Drone zoning ordinances could be an
important local-level component of that framework, enabling
municipalities to vary drone use restrictions based on the unique
attributes of specific neighborhoods within their jurisdictions. As
drone activity grows ever more common, such ordinances could
become a vital means of supplying the flexibility and local
participation needed to optimally balance drone use with landowner
safety and privacy in communities across the globe.

